EU: Strategic relations with S Caucasus

Germany, which holds the rotating EU presidency until 30 June, is working to deepen economic and political ties with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, while Brussels overtly speaks about the vital role of the Caspian Sea region for Europe's energy security.

The enhancement of the new European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), with particular attention to South Caucasus and Central Asia, is one of Berlin's priorities. The ENP initially excluded Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, but was extended to the three republics in June 2004, under the influence of the "Rose Revolution" in Georgia. As a result, three new ENP plans were launched on 14 November 2006, signaling Europe's view that the time was ripe for a more ambitious agenda.

German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier visited the republics in February. As he met his Georgian counterpart, Gela Bezhuashvili, in Tbilisi, Steinmeier said that "thanks to the current set of reforms, Georgia has a real chance to become a NATO member" and that the country's resolution of the disputes between the central government and the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia "should not be a pre-condition for its NATO-membership."

As Steinmeier and the German Social-Democrats favor closer political and economic relations with Moscow, the statement was a surprising one - and one that has surely boosted Tbilisi's hopes of integration into Western security structures.

A complicated context

The region's geopolitical context is historically complex, with Russian-Western relations complicated by NATO and EU enlargement into former Soviet areas.

Energy security and military-strategic stakes make the region a catalyst of Euro-Atlantic tensions with Moscow. As European and US needs for hydrocarbons rise, the Caspian region and Caucasian transportation routes gain more strategic significance. In addition, US concerns over Iranian and Syrian offensive military capabilities make Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan three potentially key allies in enhancing Washington's anti-ballistic defenses.

Moreover, South Caucasus still hosts "frozen conflicts," such as the separatist drives in Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Armenia and Azerbaijan's dispute over Nagorno Karabakh and the traditionally troublesome Armenian-Turkish relations.

In such hot spots, deep geopolitical changes may give intransigent factions the opportunity to attack. Furthermore, Moscow's hostility to the region's pro-Western reorientation encourages the Kremlin to support separatist movements in order to weaken pro-NATO parties in Georgia.

For Germany and the EU, thus, the challenge is to favor a gradual integration of South Caucasus into NATO and the EU, while maintaining the best possible relations with Moscow, which will inevitably remain Europe's key natural gas supplier and an indispensable diplomatic partner.

Such a goal seems difficult to attain. Europe must strike a balance between its need of good relations with Russia and its strategic interests in securing a well-functioning communication route between Southeastern Europe and the Transcaucasian republics. But it must do so at a time of nervousness between Moscow and Washington.

For these reasons, Steinmeier and the EU are worried that the US anti-missile shield projects in Central/Eastern Europe will further deteriorate Russia's relations with the entire Euro-Atlantic world, making it extremely difficult to protect Europe's security and energy interests in the broad former Soviet Union's region.

As a consequence, early this month Germany suggested that Washington engage Russia in an open dialogue over anti-missile projects within a NATO-Russia partnership framework.

However, Steinmeier's Tbilisi declarations "should not be underestimated," Dr Svante Cornell, editor of The Analyst, published by the Washington DC-based Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, told ISN Security Watch this week.

"Steinmeier's recent statements that Georgian inner problems are no obstacle to its NATO integration signal that the situation is evolving," Cornell said. According to him, after Russia showed that its hegemony over natural gas is being used by Moscow as a political lever, "German leaders tend to have a more sober approach toward Russia and more consideration for broader EU interests in the South Caucasus region."

"This is an evolution that EU members should welcome," Cornell added, since the closer Russo-German relations during the Schroeder years "meant first and foremost the strengthening of Russian influence, much more than the enhancement of European energy security interests,"

The Wider Black Sea dimension

One of the most potent drivers behind Europe's attempt to integrate South Caucasus is energy security.

After Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU this year, Europe's geopolitics shifted again. Its extension to Southeastern Europe augmented the Black Sea region's importance both from economic and energy and from security points of view. The encompassed areas have been termed the "Wider Black Sea."

The Wider Black Sea is a macro-geographical approach to the new political-strategic reality of the area. The area has the potential to become a gateway between the Balkans and the South Caucasus, linking Romania to Georgia, and, via-Azerbaijan, to the energy-strategic Caspian Sea.

It is not without reason that German diplomacy seeks to enhance its relations with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in order to set up a long energy corridor, which could bring Eastern Caspian resources to Western Europe via Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey and Southeastern Europe.

The European Neighborhood Policy-Plus (ENP-Plus) is therefore seen by Berlin as an opportunity to secure a Central Asian and South Caucasian dimension of Europe's energy and strategic security.

Such European plans meet Washington's goals to make the Wider Black Sea area a base for its ongoing military redeployment in Europe. Not surprisingly, the US has already secured the use of Romanian and Bulgarian bases on the Black Sea in the past three years.

In addition, the inauguration of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline has reinforced Turkey's influence in South Caucasus, as Ankara recently upgraded its military cooperation with Georgia and Azerbaijan, but it also has strengthened Turkey's role as a energy hub between the eastern energy-rich regions and Europe.

This aspect of the Wider Black Sea's geopolitics will force Germany and the EU to consider the risks of losing Ankara as a privileged partner, as a consequence of the recent anti-Turkish wave in some European cabinets.

Regional approach, regional differences

While Europe and NATO tend to view the South Caucasus integration issue in pan-regional terms, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan present different prospects and problems.

The political history of the three countries has been different although often geopolitically intertwined. In the post-Soviet era, Armenia has been more consistently pro-Russian than the other two republics, although such a stance has not prevented Yerevan from having warm relations with Brussels and the West.

The big issues in Armenian politics remain its strained relations with Turkey, because of Ankara's refusal to recognize the Armenian genocide of 1915, and with Azerbaijan because of the Nagorno Karabakh dispute.

Azerbaijan, in turn, has always tried to remain as autonomous as possible, cultivating good relations with the US, Europe, Turkey, Russia and Iran.

"For geopolitical reasons, only such a balanced diplomatic stance could enable Baku to guarantee national security and economic prospects," Cornell said.

"On the contrary," he added, "Georgia has been the most eager to quickly join NATO and possibly the EU, since Tbilisi fears that without this integration, it will fall prey to a renewed Russian domination."

This has become even clearer since the rise to power in 2003 of Mikhail Saakashvili.

Russo-Georgian relations hit a new low this week after Tbilisi accused Moscow of violating its sovereignty by carrying out a military operation in the Kodori-Gorge valley. The Kremlin alleges that the region is a shelter for Islamist militants linked to the Chechen insurgency. Both Russia and the Abkhazian separatists quickly denied Tbilisi's accusations, but Georgia's diplomatic relations with Russia are non-existent at the moment.

Another source of tensions that may hamper Europe's chances to integrate the South Caucasian nations is Washington's widely reported plans to install anti-ballistic missile facilities in the region - a move that Moscow says it will never accept.

Tbilisi, Baku and Yerevan last week dismissed the rumors of an imminent agreement with the Pentagon, but tensions persist.

However, many in the West still think it is possible to integrate South Caucasus into an enlarged Western security and defense architecture without losing sight of a deepened strategic cooperation with Moscow.

"Post-Cold War history shows that although Russia vociferously protests against every NATO enlargement, Moscow has always ended up adapting to the new geostrategic reality," Cornell explained.

He said it was therefore "unlikely" that in case of an EU-NATO joint enlargement to Transcaucasia, "Germany's diplomatic efforts will be able to placate Russia's rage, but it's also improbable that such a crisis will go beyond verbal attacks."

The bottom line

Germany's initiatives in South Caucasus appear to be the beginning of a new phase in EU politics. For Berlin and its European partners, energy and strategic security concerns are the first priority, even though EU public opinion is often focused on ideological approaches to European relations with Russia, the US and young democracies.

Berlin can be expected to continue its sophisticated diplomacy aimed at cultivating good relations with Russia while expanding the EU's influence and structures in Russia's near abroad. For EU states, the more Washington and Moscow work on a broad strategic cooperation, the better their chances of securing their interests.

By Federico Bordonaro for ISN Security Watch