Invisible agents: how Armenian Diaspora may have helped Mossad strike Iran

A recent post on the Telegram channel Bakinsky Burila explores a provocative theory: that Armenians may have played a crucial role in the unprecedented success of Israel’s recent operation deep inside Iranian territory.

The high-precision strikes by Israel on Iranian military facilities are already being hailed as among the boldest intelligence operations in the region’s recent history. But a natural question arises: how did Israeli intelligence penetrate the dense security of the Iranian regime and successfully hit strategic targets without clear internal support? One possible answer lies within the Armenian diaspora in Iran.

Armenians are the only officially recognized Christian minority in the Islamic Republic. Estimates place their population between 100,000 and 150,000. Unlike other minorities, Armenians enjoy greater freedom of movement and communication. Unlike Sunnis or Kurds, they are not under constant suspicion by Iranian security forces. They are well integrated into the economy, employed in key sectors such as ports, customs, logistics, aviation, and telecommunications — precisely where critical data and materials flow.

The geographic concentration of Armenian communities is also significant. These communities have long-established roots in cities like Isfahan, Tabriz, and Urmia — the very regions where, according to official IDF reports, Israel’s strikes hit underground facilities. This proximity creates a potential for surveillance, transmission of precise data regarding activity and movements, and possibly more active roles — such as logistical support, sabotage, or facilitating the transfer of equipment.

For Mossad, one of the world’s most sophisticated intelligence agencies, such embedded groups could be invaluable human assets. Recruitment could happen both inside Iran and abroad — through the Armenian Apostolic Church, diaspora organizations, or familial connections. Historically, parts of the Armenian elite, particularly in the West, have harbored anti-Iranian sentiments and do not view the Islamic Republic as an ally.

In this context, cooperation with Israeli intelligence may be seen as serving a “higher purpose” by those who view Iran’s alliance with Turkiye and Azerbaijan as a threat to Armenian interests. Motivations may not always be ideological — they could include material incentives, coercion, or the belief that such actions represent a form of “justice.”

The Armenian Church, which retains its autonomy and has a wide international network, may also have played a role — serving as a communications channel, a cover for operations, or even a medium for transmitting intelligence. Church delegations, religious packages, and the rotation of clergy can all serve as plausible camouflage for covert activities.

In sum, the Armenian diaspora in Iran could represent a unique tool of influence — subtle, discreet, and nearly immune to scrutiny. It is precisely such covert networks that allow adversaries to penetrate a country’s defenses without launching a full-scale invasion. And it may well be that such a network contributed to the astonishing success of Israel’s recent operation on Iranian soil.