Azerbaijani political analyst: Probability of breakthrough in Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations is 50 to 50

Following the Sochi meeting, Russian co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group said that Azerbaijan and Armenia will submit their proposals to the provisions of the Madrid document on which the sides still lack mutual understanding in two weeks. What new proposals Azerbaijan can make once it has reiterated its position on numerous occasions?

Earlier, the Madrid principles were discussed as a working document. To facilitate the preparation of a peace treaty on settlement of Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the Co-Chairs initially wanted the parties to reach agreement on basic principles. To confirm this agreement, it is sufficient to issue brief joint statement and the parties only need to instruct the foreign minister to immediately begin work on the peace treaty together with the Minsk Group co-chairs.

It even could be done orally not without signing any document. After all, the principles themselves do not imply the implementation. The real resolution process, namely, withdrawal of troops, establishing relationships, opening communication, return of refugees and displaced persons may begin only with specific timelines, commitments, warranties and arrangements reflected in the text of the treaty. Apparently, interim document is expected to be adopted once the preamble has been negotiated.

During the OSCE Ministerial Council in Athens, French Foreign Minister said in passing that the parties could sign a document, but something did not work at the last moment. The same issue was apparently raised in the tripartite Sochi meeting of the presidents. The parties are given two-week period for reflection and specific comments and suggestions on the text of this document. I mean stated position of the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides, textual comments and suggestions.

At the end of each year different experts and political analysts predict that the next year will mark a breakthrough in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. But with the advent of the new year, this optimism is replaced by pessimism. Do you expect a repetition of this scenario in 2010?

Failure of this round of negotiations is possible. We have many times seen parties to come closer to resolving the conflict, but to make a step back at the last minute.

It was the case with three plans of the Minsk Group in the late 1990's, during talks in Paris under the auspices of President Jacques Chirac, on eve of the OSCE Istanbul Summit and prior to the Key-West meetings in the United States. So, even now, I estimate the probability of achieving a breakthrough in the negotiations as 50 to 50. In my opinion, this is not bad odds. They must be maintained. But failure is also quite probable.

Awareness of powers, especially Russia, that maintaining the status quo of "no peace, no war" and continued occupation of Azerbaijani territories by Armenian forces will not succeed gives some optimism. Azerbaijan is getting stronger, and the military balance, which served as a guarantee of maintaining the status quo, is changing which may cause complications.

Impoverished Armenia is in no position to independently maintain the military balance and additional external funds and weapons is cumbersome for Moscow. Resumption of hostilities could harm not only mutually beneficial Russian-Azerbaijani economic relations, but also the large-scale Russian-Turkish projects.

Securing at least a framework agreement will reduce the risk of another war in the region. Russia, the United States and France also need it because it will facilitate ratification of Zurich protocols and ensure progress in the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations.

In early 2010, the Armenian Foreign Minister stated that he did not expect an agreement on Karabakh this year. In your opinion, does the pessimism of the Armenian side indicate that they are not ready to make concessions or it feels that it will have to do so?

Azerbaijan keeps silent after the Sochi meeting. Though Armenian officials say nothing about the document offered to the sides, they make pessimistic predictions. They do not want to accept it. They understand that the only lever of pressure on Azerbaijan is its occupied territories. Azerbaijan still retains demographic, economic and transportation advantages.

Even if Serzh Sargsyan is aware of the changed realities, he is forced to look at his radicals, first and foremost, those in the law enforcement agencies. So, I think that the Armenians will persist  delaying time at least until the end of April. They have a glimmer of hope that suddenly Ankara will retreat under pressure from Washington and Brussels and ratify the Zurich atifies protocols and open borders.

The inevitable gap in Azerbaijani-Turkish strategic alliance will give Yerevan benefits to either preserve the status quo or achieve a settlement to the Karabakh conflict on its own terms. Armenians believe that without Turkey’s support Azerbaijan will not dare to launch a war with Armenia which relies on an alliance with Russia. In case of Turkey’s refusal to open borders with Armenia, Yerevan hopes that Congress and President Obama will suddenly recognize the so-called “Genocide of 1915” reinforcing position of Armenians both morally and politically.

These expectations are illusory. The U.S. needs Turkey’s support in terms of Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, and in the UN Security Council, where Turkey will take up presidency from September.

When expectations of Armenians once again fail on April 24, it will be easier for Serzh Sargsyan to cope with resistance of radicals in their environment and to accept the compromise proposals of the Minsk Group. Given that Armenia is heavily dependent on external financial, economic, military support, it would be difficult to further resist the consolidated will of the international community.

But Azerbaijan will not sit idly, but continue its rapid economic development and mutually beneficial projects with Russia and, most importantly, will strengthen its armed forces.

In your views, how Armenia will use the Constitutional Court decision to make Turkey to open the Turkey-Armenia border till April 24?

Yerevan has played very ambiguous game from the very beginning. For Armenia the biggest gain was to embroil Turkey and Azerbaijan. Therefore, they hid their reservations, which nullified Turkey’s positive expectations from the Zurich protocols, for the time being.

They thought at first to wait for the gap of the strategic partnership between Azerbaijan and Turkey, and then demand Ankara to recognize borders and the so-called "genocide of 1915.” When they were convinced that an insidious game of provoking the gap between Ankara and Baku has not worked and it was impossible to delay the Constitutional Court decision, they laid their cards.

In fact, the Erdogan-Gul government wasnot fooled by Armenia’s true intentions. Ankara uses the Armenian Constitutional Court decision in order to lay the blame on Armenia for the delay in ratification of the Zurich protocols.

If progress in resolving the Karabakh conflict is reached, normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations will be given a go-ahead  and decisions of the Constitutional Court will not be an insurmountable obstacle.

After all, not Armenian claims, how noisy and intrusive they are, but Washington and Brussels’ reaction to these claims are important for Turkey. In the case of normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations,  the latter will offer Armenian lobbyists to find solutions through dialogue with Ankara as response to their appeal.

N. Abdullayeva