The lesson from Kosova: no peacekeepers be allowed to Azerbaijan

No doubt that Kosova’s independence is a precedent for the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO). Different patterns of conflicts, their histories and evolutions are irrelevant here. Precedent comprises only the fact of change of the OSCE member state’s border against its will. If one exception from the constitution of OSCE security - that is from the Helsinki principles, - is possible, then why there cannot be two or three exceptions?

In light of the precedent set by Kosova for the former NKAO, the so called Prague process that framed the conflict settlement negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia since late 2004, looks even more unacceptable to Azerbaijan.

The well-known essence of the Prague process consists in the following: Baku agrees on a deferred referendum about the status of former NKAO, places an international peacekeeping force on its own territory, and then Armenia begins gradual withdrawal of forces from the occupied territories around former NKAO.

From the very beginning, Azerbaijan was mistaken in considering itself as the party almost doomed to win such process. Indeed, high rates of oil-driven economic development and temporary growth of the geopolitical importance have turned the country’s head. Our negotiators believed that we lived in a static world where international law always played on the side of territorial integrity, and that in 10-15 years we would be able rather easily dump the burden of obligations concerning the referendum on the status of former NKAO.

However, the recent events in Kosova show that it will be not so easy to dump the carelessly taken obligations. First of all, this concerns the issue of peacekeepers. As we see, they deprived Serbia of both last physical and last political opportunity to prevent independence drive of Kosova.

Note that the peacekeepers have been placed in Kosova with the formal consent of Belgrade, and by countries recognizing Serbia’s territorial integrity. Even Azerbaijan has been holding a contingent there all these years. Nevertheless, the peacekeepers brought in with Belgrade’s consent became the boundary which Serbia failed to pass when Albanians declared their independence.

Now let us imagine that one day Serzh Sarkissian or Levon Ter-Petrossian accepts the plan which the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group are trying to sell to us, and which Azerbaijan has already bought in part concerning the accommodation of peacekeepers.

The further scenario looks extremely gloomy. Peacekeepers get placed in the conflict zone with Baku consenting. Yerevan gradually withdraws troops from the five occupied districts, and may be even from seven. It intentionally encourages and supports interethnic tension within the former NKAO for the duration of all negotiated 10-15 years. And then local Armenians conduct a referendum about independence. If the independence of Kosova does not bring any catastrophe to Europe by then, the Europeans will simply force Azerbaijan to recognize the results of such referendum even if it has had not been stipulated in the agreements. Then Azerbaijan will appear absolutely in the same situation in which even democratic Serbia vegetates today.

Solution? If official Baku cannot quickly slow down the Prague process, which appeared to be so deceptive, it must urgently change at least its stance on the issue of peacekeepers.  Since we did not need peacekeepers to maintain cease-fire in the past 14 years, then why do we need them for the period of implementation of a peace agreement?

Ilgar Mammadov
Day.Az