New geopolitics in S Caucasus: Russia's growing pressure on Yerevan regarding Zangazur

• What sort of impressions did the state visit of President Vladimir Putin to Azerbaijan create in the region?
• What did the Foreign Ministry of Armenia mean by its implicit response to Lavrov's accusation?
• Good-faith support of Russia in the peace talks, or being a mediator as a third party?
• What are the common interests of the West and Russia in opening the Zangazur corridor?

On August 18-19, the state visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Azerbaijan was marked by very important events. During the meeting, documents intended to develop friendship and cooperation, as well as trade relations and investment, were signed between the two countries.

Russia is the largest country in the region, and Azerbaijan attaches great importance to strengthening relations with its northern neighbor, Russia.
Azerbaijan, which regained its independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, further developed its relations with Russia. Most recently, on February 22, 2022, a declaration of alliance consisting of 43 articles was signed between Baku and Moscow.

The documents signed within the framework of President Putin's visit to Baku completed some provisions of the declaration of alliance.

Reasons for strengthening Baku-Moscow relations

In 2020, Azerbaijan's retaliatory measure against the Armenian offensive signaled a victory that could end the 30-year occupation. However, there were certain obstacles in the course of the war, which Azerbaijan could overcome only thanks to its political superiority. Russia's good move in not preventing Azerbaijan's military operations and anti-terrorist measures against separatist groups in Garabagh in 2023 contributed to the quick end of the Garabagh conflict. In addition, the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Garabagh in 2024 earlier than the time specified in the agreement has once again demonstrated the official Kremlin's special attitude towards Azerbaijan.

Subtle moments that bring Russia closer to Azerbaijan

The 4-year period from 2020 until now is of exceptional importance in the history of Azerbaijan. During this time, in addition to the solution of the Garabagh conflict, Moscow's interest in opening communications over Zangazur and reaching a peace agreement between Yerevan and Baku has been the best reflection of the geostrategic realities formed in the region. In the literal sense of the word, Russia sees Azerbaijan as a beacon in the South Caucasus against the backdrop of the worsening of relations with the West and Armenia. In this regard, the state visit of President Putin to Baku can be evaluated as the official Kremlin considers Azerbaijan its most reliable ally.

Russia is already loyal to the issue of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan and it lambasts the Westernized Armenia that avoids peace talks and refuses to participate in the bilateral platform.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's last statement accusing the Armenian side of sabotaging the negotiation process was a message for both the West, which plays the role of influence, and Yerevan, which is unable to fulfill its promise.

Considering the response of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, it seems that the Pashinyan administration, which is loyal to the dictates of the West, completely rejects Russia's participation in the negotiation process. But what is the main premise of Russia's proposal for peace talks? Is it to mediate in the process as a third party, or is it just a good-faith contribution that Moscow wants to make to the peace process as soon as possible? Certainly, Azerbaijan is currently on the side of conducting negotiations on a bilateral platform. Because the participation of the third party in the negotiations causes certain contradictions and slows down the processes. Here, the national interests of the mediating parties impact the two parties reaching a common agreement. But Putin's proposal is different from the West's attempt to intervene, and he seems to be more in favor of stability in the region.

Converging interests in the Zangazur corridor

Recently, interest in the opening of the Zangazur Corridor has begun to be felt more in the position of both the West and the Russian side.

Both the war with Georgia in 2008 and the sanctions imposed by the West after the war with Ukraine led to the narrowing of Russia's transport opportunities, as well as the interruption of its direct relations with Armenia and Europe.

The closure of the railway through Abkhazia and the serious problems on the Upper Lars highway have cut ties with Armenia, Russia's most important ally at the time, and reduced its hopes for it.

Due to all these reasons, Russia is interested in opening both the North-South Corridor and the Zangazur Corridor and expanding the transport opportunities for the country. In addition, the opening of the Zangazur Corridor provides Russia with a direct connection to Iran via Nakhchivan and through the North-South Corridor from Astara.

Although Iran, in turn, does not take a positive approach to the opening of the Zangazur Corridor, the geostrategic realities in the region have softened Tehran's position somewhat. Even the fact that the West has started military exercises in Armenia does not worry Iran as much as before. So every problem is feasible and has a solution. If Iran, standing rigid with its conservative approach and no-trespassing red line, is changing today, then there can be no problem in opening the Zangazur Corridor. The only problem is that Armenia will understand how much it can benefit from the opening of the Corridor and at the same time it can get great chances in the region with the thawing of the ice with Ankara.