What is the possible impact of Turkey-Russia relations on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?

During talks in Ankara, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev noted progress in the Karabakh talks saying that “there are encouraging steps in the conflict resolution.” In your opinion, what was the Russian President referring to by “progress?”

Of course, for us there is sole criterion of progress in the talks, that is, concrete steps to liberate the occupied territories and to return refugee to their lands. Azerbaijan sees no progress other than this. But international mediators have their own opinion and their criteria.

Apparently, they see some factors as “encouraging”: talks based on the Madrid principles have intensely moved lately, the Minsk Group has developed "updated version" of the framework document on principles of the conflict settlement at the presidential level on the basis of intensive negotiations, Azerbaijan had already declared it accepts this document and though Armenia delays response, it has not rejected the document either.

An attempt to normalize Turkish-Armenian relations is also an encouraging point for the international observers. The fact that this process has been suspended, but the parties are still taking steps to normalize relations and have not withdrawn from the Zurich protocols allows international brokers to make encouraging statements.

This is only opinion of mediators and Azerbaijan has already developed a strong immunity to the optimistic statements that we have heard hundreds of times over the last 15 years.  We appreciate only the result, but not Olympic-type process “it is not important to win, but participate.”

How do you assess activities of the OSCE Minsk Group? Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan announced that Turkey could participate in the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations  if the Minsk Group will continue to make a success towards the conflict resolution. How do you assess Turkey's chances to become one of the co-chairs at this stage of the negotiations?

How can we assess the activities of the co-chairs since they have not achieved even some initial agreements on common principles for a settlement over the 15-year talks? It took the co-chairs 10 years to form a coordinated position so that acute geopolitical competition between them will not turn to the United States, Europe and Russia into a swan, a pike and cancer from a famous fable and they would not drag the negotiation process in different directions.

The joint statement made by the presidents of the Minsk Group co-chairs countries is, apparently, a kind of demonstration that they have a consolidated position on the Karabakh conflict settlement. But this is still not enough to persuade Armenia to compromise settlement plan. With regard to Turkey’s enhanced role, it is very positive factor which has a positive impact on the overall atmosphere in the South Caucasus region. But we need to be realistic.

It is unlikely that Turkey will be able to combine the two roles simultaneously - the party to the Armenian-Turkish normalization and international mediator in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict settlement. This does not mean that Turkey’s possibility is limited or its potential will not be required for the Karabakh conflict settlement.

The main point is the formal side of things. But in practice, Turkey, even without being officially OSCE Minsk Group co-chair, can make very significant contribution to the settlement of the Karabakh conflict comparable to the role of official co-chairs. Turkish President hinted precisely to this when he recently talked about the transition to the "quiet diplomacy". I am sure that this applied both Turkish-Armenian normalization and Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement.

In your opinion, how the Turkish-Russian relations can be viewed from the perspective of solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?

Turkish-Russian rapprochement and strategic partnership relations between the two countries is one of the most important geopolitical processes in our region from historical viewpoint after the collapse of the Soviet Union. If this process will develop further, it can change a lot in our region for the better. For hundreds of years, Russia has considered the Ottoman Empire and then modern Turkey one of the major geopolitical opponents in this region and visa versa.

Under this geopolitical rivalry, leverages like the Kurdish and Armenian separatism and political and military support to Armenia as a "springboard" to throw into Asia Minor were used against the enemy. Certainly, these circumstances had an important impact on Russia’s position on the Karabakh conflict and especially in the early stages deteriorated the Russian-Azerbaijani relations. But gradually things fell into place. First, we witnessed normalization of the Russian-Azerbaijani relations and now the Russian-Turkish relations have reached the level of strategic partnership.

It certainly will have an impact on many regional issues. Russia was one of the important co-sponsors of attempts to normalize Armenian-Turkish relations not by chance. But positively assessing the whole process, we must bear in mind that these important geopolitical changes are not implemented in a short time and we must exercise some patience and consistency and to see tangible results of this positive project.

May 2 marked 16th anniversary since Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a ceasefire agreement to end hostilities in the Karabakh conflict zone. What significant changes have taken place in Nagorno-Karabakh settlement over the years?

The signing of the ceasefire agreement in May 1994 was result of achieving certain political and military parity between the parties to the conflict. In early April 1994, Armenia began a major military operation to capture Terter, Barda and strike a blow in the direction of Yelakh in a bid to cut off the western regions of the rest of the country and go directly to Ganja, threatening to capture the second largest city in the country.

The Armenian side believed that success of this operation guaranteed surrender of Azerbaijan and separation of Karabakh from Azerbaijan. For the month of bloody fighting, the Armenian side lost dozens of armored vehicles, over a thousand living force and was able to capture only a few villages. It was the biggest defeat of the Armenian army and it had to give up offensive operations.

Therefore, in May 1994, Armenia signed a ceasefire agreement without any preconditions which were previously put forward. As for the changes that have occurred since then, there is one rule - the ceasefire is beneficial for the side that effectively uses the allotted time modernizing its forces and implementing effective reform in the army. Given that Azerbaijan has a much greater human, financial and industrial resources than Armenia, I think that once in 1994 the myth of invincibility of the Armenian army was shattered and certain military and political parity was reached, then in the next 15 years the Azerbaijani side, had greater opportunities to change the balance of power in region in its favour.


/Day.Az/