Day.Az interview with Russian political analyst Sergey Markedonov.
What are your comments on the decision by the U.S. Congress House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Relations to recognize the “Armenian genocide”?This is not the first attempt by the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Relations to raise the Armenian issue. The latest attempt to adopt similar draft resolution was made in October 2007.
If you take look at the history of Armenian issue inside the U.S., all kinds of resolutions on this matter have been adopted since 1916. Until 1945 they had mostly civil character. But later they assumed a political nature. There is constant debate in the U.S. how to label these events – whether as “massacre”, or “genocide”.
I recall that during the election campaign, both President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proposed to recognize those events as "genocide". So, there is nothing surprising about what has happened.
Worthy of note is that the discussions over the Armenian issue showed presence of two vectors in American foreign policy which often balance each other. There is a group of politicians who advocate rejection of all such documents, resolutions and maintaining good relations with Turkey while others call on the House of Representatives to adopt the resolution discussed in the Committee on Foreign Relations.
I think that these two vectors will further exist in American politics. Some of them will periodically reinforce some - weaken, and vice versa. But now, I see no willingness in the U.S. administration to go further than that done in the committees.
Can the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict still be considered frozen following the U.S. Congress committee’s recent move and Turkey’s strong reaction? Do you think the risk of renewed hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia has significantly increased?I do not think that we should expect a serious break-down of relations between the U.S. and Turkey. There are certain limits defined by the red line beyond which the parties do not move. I think that the Turks, of course, unhappy with U.S. policy not only on the Armenian issue, but also on Iraq. However, this has not yet resulted in any dramatic consequences such as, for example, withdrawal from NATO and closure of Incirlik airbase through which bulk of goods is delivered to Iraq from America.
Relations between the two countries could change radically if President Obama personally admits this point and if the administration at the federal level accedes to the position which even the House of Representatives did not adhere. Even the Foreign Relations Committee vote was difficult enough - 23 votes to 22.
As for the Karabakh conflict, I do not see prerequisite for its military solution. To make such a solution possible, one side needs to have sharp military superiority over another. In addition, modern war is not a purely military action, this is also picture made of information.
In the event of renewed hostilities in Karabakh, there will be no "two-color" approach which we witnessed in the case of Russia and Georgia. Neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan will be perceived as an agent of the West. The views of different countries will be strongly divided and their lobbyists will work with both sides. And Azerbaijan will not have serious information advantage.
Unlike South Ossetia, it is not a closed space, but nearly 200-kilometer long front line. I think military escalation is less to happen. Besides, war rhetoric will be used as an instrument of pressure, for example, on Turkey to slow down the Armenian-Turkish normalization.
Do you mean Turkey will make efforts towards rapprochement with Russia following the recent move by the U.S.?I would not dramatize what has happened in only one Committee. Of course, this is important event, but not dramatic.
What will be the situation in the region? Will it be difficult for Moscow to handle the mediation role in the region on its own in case the U.S. leaves the region? Azerbaijan has its great interests in the West. "Contract of the Century" remains in force. Both Ankara and Baku can make some friendly demonstrative steps for Russia. However, it does not mean that things will change radically, for example, Turkey will leave the North Atlantic Alliance and support the idea of a Eurasian Union.
In addition, Hillary Clinton has already stated unequivocally that the U.S. administration would not support further advance of the Armenian resolution. That is, the ruling forces of America will take administrative effort to block such initiatives at the level of the House of Representatives.
R. Mehdiyev