Azerbaijani political expert: Armenia’s blackmail will hardly be effective

The Armenian Constitutional Court has endorsed the Armenia-Turkey protocols with reservations which sparked anger by Turkey. Does it mean Armenia tries to drag out ratification of the protocols?

It's not only trying to delay ratification process. I think, normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations cannot be a matter of months as reflected in the "road map". For nearly 100 years, these relations were based on the image of the "enemy", there were terrorist attacks against Turkish diplomats, formal territorial claims, not to mention the charges and the large-scale so-called "genocide" company in Armenia and worldwide. Is it possible to overcome all this with one stroke of the pen for a few months? Perhaps, the answer is no.

I think that the authors of "road map" of the Armenian-Turkish reconciliation made the same mistake as the authors "road map" of the Palestinian-Israeli reconciliation deciding to establish the exact date of passing the "road map". In the Middle East settlement, according to the "road map", process had to be completed by early 2006, in just three years. It is already 2010, and the Palestinian-Israeli "road map" is stuck somewhere in the quarters of the way, not even half. Even then, many experts pointed out that the "road map" is a successful technology to withdraw the negotiations from impasse, from the frozen state, but it is wrong to set dates of its passage, it is better to indicate only stages and accurate description of the contents of each phase. This lesson was not taken into account by developers of the Armenian-Turkish "road map" and the result seems to be the same - the process will go much more slowly than anticipated.

The Armenian Foreign Minister said that the Armenian-Turkish talks could be derailed because of Turkey’s unwillingness to establish contacts. Do you think that Armenia is trying to blackmail Turkey, or the situation between the countries have become really acute?

The situation, of course, became much more complicated for the Armenian side after Turkey announced a link between normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations and settlement of the Karabakh conflict. Armenia’s atempt to split the Turkish-Azerbaijani strategic alliance failed. Decision of the Armenian Constitutional Court seeks to increase the country’s "stake" in this diplomatic game, sending Ankara's message - you will waive any preconditions in the form of a breakthrough in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, and we will reconsider the CC decision. Armenia’s blackmail will hardly be effecttive. More likely, one needs expect the same version as the "road map" of the Palestinian-Israeli reconciliation - the process will be much more difficult and time-consuming than it seemed to sponsors.

May the aggravated Armenian-Turkish relations have an impact on settlement of the Karabakh conflict?

There will be no negative impact for the simple reason that the negotiations within the Minsk process have failed for many years. There is no room to worsen the situation even further. Resumption of hostilities would be the worst case. But it would too naïve to assume that inhibition of the Armenian-Turkish dialogue could provoke a new war in the region. There can be only  positive influence, because Turkey’s clear position is one of the additional incentives to achieve some positive results in the negotiation process.

What can we expect from the forthcoming tripartite meeting between the presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia to take place in Sochi on Jan. 25? Is it possible to expect the signing of any document after the meeting?

This question requires more detailed answer as it is in the center of public opinion at the moment. In fact, during the years of negotiations, the general formula for a possible compromise has long been known both to the conflicting sides and mediators. Nothing new was examined during these years.

The negotiations lasted so long for a simple reason that there was not sufficient motivation, political will, internal and external conditions to begin the settlement process. In other words, the problem was not at the negotiating table, but around it - socio-economic and political situation in the region, positions of major foreign players such as Russia, the United States and the European Union. For a long time, these factors have contributed to the freezing process. Armenia developed with the support of Russia at the very least, mediators pulled the blanket over on themselves and did not act in coordination. How can one expect a breakthrough in the negotiation process in this case?

Things began to change in the past two years. First, the events of August 2008 cut off the only direct communication between Armenia and Russia via Georgia. This is not only the economic component.  Russia’s military bases is located in Armenia’s territory. How to supply them? Through Turkey, a NATO member and a country to which Armenia put forward territorial claims? Or via Azerbaijan, 20 percent lands of which has been occupied by Armenia? Both Yerevan and  Moscow were to find a way out of this new situation.

Global financial crisis ensued the August events hitting Armenia harder on the backdrop of the country’s lack of sufficient domestic resources for economic development and also because of its remaining outside of the regional economic processes due to its aggressive territorial claims against its neighbors. Fall in Armenia’s GDP last year was a record in the CIS and the substantial assistance of Russia, on which Armenia could no longer rely because Russia itself experienced economic problems due to global crisis, lost of direct transportation links with Armenia due to the closure of the Georgian communications. Yerevan and Moscow had to find a way out from this situation.

In the meantime, Russia and Turkey began to establish strategic partnership. The latter has become a key partner of Russia in its energy strategy aimed at the conquest of the South-European gas market.

For the first time since 1994, since the start of negotiations within the Minsk process between the mediators (Russia and the U.S.),  efforts were made to build understanding regarding the settlement of Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. The August events, some transformation and so-called "restart" of the Russian-American relations had a certain impact on it.

Finally, Azerbaijan’s growing military-industrial potential is of great importance. The question "whom the time works for?" is already removed from the agenda at a time of fruitless negotiations within the Minsk Group. Azerbaijan is increasing its military-industrial superiority over Armenia every year with a well-predictable consequences in the future.

All of the above mentioned necessitates a new situation around the negotiation process. You do not need to be especially prominent analyst to find the answer to the above questions - Armenia needs to normalize relations with its neighbors, to set up mutually beneficial economic ties to ensure some prospects for normal development and a stable future.

Russia has also got enough motivation for a progress in the negotiation process, without this it would be difficult to respond to the challenges posed by the new situation in the region. In terms of the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, the problem is that both Yerevan and Moscow believe that the priority is the issue of settling the Armenian-Turkish relations. It is possible that if this happens and is sufficient to ensure Armenia’s stable future, Yerevan will expect to maintain the occupation of Azerbaijani territories until it receives specific guarantees for future independence of Nagorno Karabakh. Baku’s fears in this regard are reasonable, and certainly must be considered by Moscow. Therefore, Ankara's and Baku’s rigid position on link between Karabakh problem and  Armenian-Turkish normalization encourages the parties to achieve concrete results at the upcoming meeting, I believe.

The only question is whether these moves are serious and aimed at resolving the Karabakh conflict, or another portion of "beauty" motions intended only to "grease" the process of Turkish-Armenian normalization.

N. Abdullayeva