Epilogue to Erdogan's and Lavrov's visits: What Turkish and Russian "cooks" are preparing in the Caucasian kitchen?

Turkish, Armenian and Azerbaijani media makes different conclusions while commenting on Turkish PM Erdogan’s Moscow visit and Russian FM Lavrov’s Yerevan visit which took place immediately after Erdogan left for Moscow. They mainly agree in opinion that Azerbaijan and Turkey’s expectations that Russia will influence Armenia to encourage it to make compromise in the Karabakh issue were not met. But, is it true?

Lest have a look at facts. In response to a question whether Russia’s energy interests may be more important than Karabakh people’s right to self-determination, Armenian reporters got a laconic answer “may not”. So what? Any minister would answer any publicly asked question exactly the same way in Yerevan.  However, Russia’s real interests and real policy are unlikely to fit into the Procrustean bed of this laconic reply.

Lavrov  also expressed his negative attitude towards linking resolution of the Karabakh conflict with the Armenia-Turkey normalization and added that “We believe that the position of the Karabakh people should be taken into consideration while drafting such an agreement. The way it will be implemented must be negotiated. But this is obvious for me.”

There is nothing new and unexpected in Lavrov’s statement. The OSCE Minks Group co-chairs have traveled to Nagorno-Karabakh  to inform the separatists of the course of the negotiations many times and took their opinion into account. Azerbaijan has reiterated on many occasions that the Armenian community will be involved in the negotiations once Armenian armed forces withdraw from Azerbaijan’s lands.

Obviously, Lavrov said nothing new in Yerevan.  Armenians are really nervous trying to catch at any straw to keep illusion of Moscow’s everlasting and tacit permission of territorial claims to neighbors, first and foremost, to Azerbaijan.

I believe restraint and brevity of Russian FM’s public statements should rather have alerted them. It is likely that this is due to Moscow’s unwillingness to agitate public opinion in Yerevan ahead of time and to complicate life of the Armenian leadership on the eve of the decisive rounds of negotiations on settlement of the Karabakh conflict.

As to Russia’s Prime Minister Putin, at a joint press conference with Erdogan he noted that the Karabakh conflict and Turkish-Armenian normalization are quite complex issues and therefore it is impractical to link them from a tactical and strategic viewpoint. Furthermore, Putin said: "We are aware of the plight and the legacy from past times of Turkey and Armenia, and we are interested in settlement of Armenian-Turkish relations. We hope that any elements of extreme approaches, based on the problems of the past, will be removed from the negotiation process.”

As we see, Putin also has not said anything that had not previously spoken in this regard by Russia's leadership and Turkey’s Western partners. Some of Russia's diplomats and analysts have commented on Vladimir Putin’s statements in the sense that the link is not desirable to ensure that the Armenian-Turkish antagonism would not complicate the prospects of resolving the Karabakh conflict. Clearly, this is an excuse. PM Putin is aware that the Karabakh conflict and Armenian-Turkish normalization are interdependent, and that both of these issues must be solved soon.  

However, Russia needs different sequence than it is seen in Ankara and Baku. According to Moscow’s estimations, normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations and opening of borders could strengthen position of its strategic ally Armenia on one hand and push Azerbaijan into Russia's embrace on the other.

In such a situation, deprived of Turkish support, Azerbaijan will become more pliable and responsive to Russia's "advice". It will be easier for Moscow to impose such a settlement of the Karabakh conflict, which, on one hand, would satisfy most of the wishes of its Armenian allies and tightly bound both Azerbaijan and Armenia to Russia on the other.

But the situation implies that it is not Moscow, but Ankara  who decides opening the Armenian-Turkish border. Turkey made clear its unequivocal stance on this issue not only to Russia, but American leadership publicly. In fact, it is not easy to put pressure on Ankara. After all, all need Turkey’s support on a wide range of issues ranging from Iran's nuclear program, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and others, especially on the eve of its presidency of the UN Security Council. Ankara's position on Abkhazia and in terms of ensuring stability and security in South Caucasus without direct involvement of the United States, NATO and the EU in this process is crucial for Moscow.

Of course, we are not talking about some sort of a separate conspiracy by Ankara and Moscow behind Washington and Brussels. Hopes that Turkey can be persuaded to recognize the independence of Abkhazia, as stated by Russia's media from time to time, are illusory. Ankara will not act against its Western allies. But it is quite possible that Ankara will establish trade and economic relations and transportation links with Abkhazia in response to Moscow’s similar moves with the Northern Cyprus. The platform of stability and cooperation in South Caucasus proposed by Turkey after the Russia-Georgian war in August 2008 can seem to Moscow a promising option on which one can work as it provides for not only for progress in the settlement of Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, development of Turkish-Abkhaz relations, but also a convergence between Moscow and Baku.

Therefore, those who rush to declare the failure of Erdogan's visit to Moscow in the context of the Caucasian perspective are wrong. It is stated publicly that Russia is not going to put pressure on Armenia. But just one phone call from the Kremlin or Lavrov's visit to Yerevan were enough to confirm it. We are witnessing Russia’s unusual activity in the Karabakh issue. Armenian Defense Minister Seyran Ohanyan and the so-called "president" of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Bako Sahakyan paid a one-day visit to Moscow one after another. Armenian President Armenia Serzh Sargsyan tripped there on Jan. 18. According to foreign and local media, Azerbaijani, Russian and Armenian presidents are expected to meet to discuss resolution of the Karabakh conflict in late January. The meeting has been initiated by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. It was also announced that the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs will visit the region soon.

Turkish and Russian "cooks" are obviously preparing some sort of "dish" in the Caucasian kitchen although it is not clear who will like it most of all. It is not ruled out that Moscow would like to be satisfied with imitation of a breakthrough in settlement of the Karabakh conflict, through adoption of the statement in which the parties to the conflict not in a binding form would declare that they accept the so-called "Madrid principles". This would enable Ankara to start the process of ratification of Zurich protocols and open Armenian-Turkish border. As for the peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia the conclusion of which could actually start the liberation of the occupied territories, it could again be delayed by endless arguments about the wording.

However, imitation of the Karabakh settlement process has no long-term prospects since for Russia such imitation will not open communications to Armenia and then to Turkey and Iran via Azerbaijan. The arms race continues. Azerbaijan felt betrayed in its expectations, is quite capable of dramatic action, which may confuse cards to all players in the South Caucasus. It is high time to take tangible steps for withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijani territories and postponing it means to jeopardize not only peace in the region, but major Russian-Turkish and Russian-Azerbaijani projects. The events have have their own logic and it is important that it has acquired positive momentum. The talks which began as a diplomatic soundings and imitation may well lead to peace and benefit everybody in the end.  

Azerbaijani political expert Rasim Musabayov