A secret agreement may have already been concluded on Nagorno-Karabakh: Eurasian Strategy Project Director

Day.Az: Turkey and Armenia  have agreed to start negotiations to resume diplomatic ties. Turkey has stated on numerous occasions  that border between Turkey and Armenia will not be reopened until occupied Azerbaijani lands are freed. Will establishment of diplomatic ties  between Armenia and Turkey have a positive impact on resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?
 
Cory Welt: It is true that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict – and Azerbaijan’s interests in general – appear to be overlooked in the text of the protocols. This is not too surprising from the perspective of the documents themselves, which outline principles of bilateral relations, but it does seem strange given the promise of the Turkish leadership a few months ago that progress would have to be made on Nagorno-Karabakh before Turkey opened its border. We can only assume one of two things: either a secret agreement has already been concluded on Nagorno-Karabakh that will allow for simultaneous progress on the conflict, in which case we will hear more about it shortly, or – and in my estimation more realistically – the Turkish government is going to allow parliament, which still has to ratify the protocol, to hold out for concrete progress on Karabakh before it does so.

This could lead to a positive outcome for Azerbaijan. The more Armenia – and Armenian society – is convinced that it is on the brink of normal relations with Turkey, the more likely it is that Yerevan will be further encouraged to take steps to resolve the conflict. The key is for Azerbaijan not to have too high expectations about receiving everything it believes it is owed in too short a timeframe. The resolution of the Karabakh conflict will undoubtedly be a gradual process.
 
Q: There is opinion that for Armenia process of normalizing relationship with Turkey can give opposite results, that is, reopening of borders can lead to “negative consequences”. What do “negative consequences” imply?
 
A: Well, those for whom Turkish recognition of the Armenian genocide is the paramount concern may fear that normalization of relations with Turkey will further reduce the incentive for Turkey to ever recognize the genocide, and also dampen the incentive of countries like the United States to also push for official recognition. Also, even if the border were to open without a full resolution of the Karabakh conflict, conceivably some may fear that with the easing of pressure on Armenia from Turkey, Armenian society itself will over time lost interest in the Karabakh cause and be more willing to engage in compromises to return territory to Azerbaijan. For those that are against this, such an outcome would be a negative one.

Q: In what case is military settlement to the Karabakh conflict possible? Could this be a solution to the problem given the fact that the negotiations have lasted for quite long period of time?
 
A: It is very difficult for me to predict that Azerbaijan might pursue a military resolution to the conflict after the Russia-Georgia war. Before the war, the Azerbaijani government might have convinced itself that such a solution was possible, but now it should be clear that Russia, as Armenia’s military ally, would be compelled to come to Armenia’s defense in the event of hostilities. We shouldn’t exclude the possibility of wars being fought for reasons other than to achieve victory, but at this point in time it seems unlikely that such would occur.

Teymur T.
Day.Az