Vuqar Seidov: "Until the limits of plebiscite are defined, we should not agree on replacement of Armenian occupational forces with international peacekeepers"

Today.Az has already reported with reference to Regnum agency that on Friday, deputy assistant US Secretary of State Matthew Bryza made a declaration regarding ways of Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement.

In particular, the US co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group said that "as soon as the occupied lands return to Azerbaijan, they will be demilitarized, international peacekeeping forces will be deployed there, Armenian armed troops will be withdrawn and they will not be as strained as now, when Armenian and Azerbaijani armed forces are separated from each others by mine fields and in some cases by 100 meters". The US diplomat assured that "Armenians would be in a greater safety if territories return back to Azerbaijan".

At the same time, Matthew Bryza noted that agreement would not be achieved if it is unacceptable for Armenia. "I agree that it would be risky for the Armenian President if he agrees to return the lands to Azerbaijan, the same as there is a political risk for Azerbaijan, if it gives to Armenia what it wants in exchange to the lands", said Matthew Bryza, drawing attention of the Armenian side to a number of attractive moments, such as creation of a corridor between Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia and procedure of definition of the status of Nagorno Karabakh.

For comments on the said announcement Day.Az appealed to political reviewer Vuqar Seidov, who said the following:

Official Baku should be cautious about Matthew Bryza's announcement. It contains an element, which may play a role of a trap for Azerbaijan in the future. We will speak of it later.

First of all, it is necessary to note that speaking of the return of  territories, Bryza does not specify, what he means under it. He might have meant only 7 regions around Nagorno Karabakh or all lands of Azerbaijan, occupied by Armenia, including the seven regions and Nagorno Karabakh and three small exclaves (Kerki, Yukhari Askipara and Barkhudarli), uncontrolled by Baku. In the first case, the talk should not be continued: which deployment of peacekeeping forces is spoken of if only a part of lands is liberated? And where will they be deployed? In Aghdam or in Fizuli?

Certainly, common sense implies the second case and the returned territories should mean also Nagorno Karabakh. In other words, it is implied that the borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan are restored de-facto in the form they had in the Soviet times de jure, including all exclaves and enclaves (as far as I know, the two countries have not concluded any agreement regarding exchange of exclaves and, consequently, the issue of mutual liberation of occupied exclaves should not be removed from the agenda).

Second, speaking on the creation of a corridor between Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia, Matthew Bryza does not say anything about a creation of a similar corridor in Megri. I do not know if this issue is raised during private talks, but I would like to note that the creation of a corridor in one place and unwillingness to create a similar corridor in another place, not differing much from Lachin, creates a disbalance in the positions of the two sides. If restoration of trust in the region is spoken of, how can one create privileges for itself and reject providing a privilege for the opposite side? If there is a de-facto land communication between Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia, which is illegal, by the way, there is no land communication, either de-facto or de-jure, between Nakhchivan and the rest of Azerbaijan. And if in case of Nagorno Karabakh the question is a communication between one state (Armenia) and a part of another state (part of Azerbaijan), in case of Nakhchivan we have two parts of one and the same state, separated from each other by a country, which is in turn striving for creation of a corridor in another part of the region. Therefore, Baku has a right to raise this issue and equalize the status of Lachin corridor to Megri.

If the argument of the Armenian side is that "we have a right to claim for the corridor, as we shed our blood in Lachin and you did not shed your blood in Megri", these a priori provokes Baku for similar measures on the other part of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, which is extremely undesirable and inexpedient for both parties, not speaking of the illegality of such steps per se. Therefore, it would be fair for the issue of corridors to be settled on the basis of balance and mutuality, while Matthew Bruza's statements almost never contain this issue.

And the third and the most important one. Let's recall how western states were separating Kosovo from Serbia, unnoticed for Serbia. They did it by phases but purposely. In the very beginning Belgrade had their word that in all variants of the conflict resolution, Serbia's territorial integrity will not be violated and peacekeepers are only needed to maintain order in the region and restore the damaged infrastructure and public regulation mechanisms. But as soon as KFOR forces were deployed in the region, NATO seemed to forget about its promises. Even despite obvious progress in the democratization of the Serbian community, it became difficult for Belgrade to get repeated confirmations of its formal sovereignty over Kosovo -the peaceekepers settled in the region profoundly and Serbians became aware that they had once been entrapped. It was almost impossible to restore the sovereignty by way of war in conditions of NATO forces deployment in Kosovo. And it was then a time for introduction of a new player- Marti Akhtisaari. His role in the rest of the match and the final score is well known to everyone. Serbia, assured of its territorial integrity, lost this game.

In conditions of growing military might of Azerbaijan, it is most important for Armenia to rule out possibility of renewal of hostilities. Today's front line is the maximum, which Armenians managed to attain in conditions of internal war in Azerbaijan in the early 1990s. The frontline will, undoubtedly, change if hostilities are renewed and not in favor of Armenian side (though Bako Saakyan regularly speak about transfer of military actions into the center of Azerbaijan and Armenian Defense Minister threatens with occupation of additional 20% of Azerbaijani lands). No matter how the new front line seems and what the cost of these changes is, Armenians would hardly manage to expand the control area. They will only lose their positions. Therefore, for Yerevan it is important to prevent resumption of hostilities and at the same time preserve Nagorno Karabakh during the negotiations.

It can undoubtedly be attained by either tactics of exhausting the opposite side by decades of obstinacy and lack of compromise (which failed as Azerbaijan has rather grown its might and confirmed readiness to war) or by external help, which peakeeperers are attributed to. Backed by the peacekeepers, one may hold a profitable referendum and be sure on non-resumption of hostilities.

Azerbaijan's legal right to restore sovereignty over the occupied lands by way of war is a trump card, which the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk group and Armenia try to deprive Azerbaijan of. It can be neutralized only by a similar trump card of the opposite side, which implies deployment of peacekeeping forces in the region, against which Azerbaijani armed forces would hardly be used.

Matthew Bryza's recent statement create a unique situation, when it is more reasonable for Azerbaijanis, insisting on the phased resolution of the conflict for all these years, to start to ponder over the details of the last stage (definition of the final status of the region), before agreeing to initiation of the first phase. Until limits of future plebiscite on Nagorno Karabakh status, ruling out separation of the region from Azerbaijan, are defined and coordinated, the agreement on replacement of Armenian occupational forces with international peacekeepers will threaten with Kosovo trap for Azerbaijan. If the format and limits of the referendum are coordinated not before the deployment of peacekeepers in the region but after it, the Armenian side will have a chance to insist on such a referendum, which does not rule out the independence of Nagorno Karabakh. It would be as difficult for Azerbaijan to argue on the format of referendum following deployment of peacekeepers as it was for Belgrade.

Distrust is what prevents Armenia and Azerbaijan from attaining an agreement. Armenians are concerned with the security of the Armenian population of Nagorno Karabakh and suspect that Azerbaijan will drive Armenians away from Nagorno karabakh as soon as it gets its seven regions back, while Azerbaijan is concerned with formalization of the loss of Nagorno Karabakh and narrowing of its territory and accuses Armenia of occupying territories beyond Nagorno Karabakh and driving Azerbaijanis away of those lands to use refugees and occupied territories as objects of speculations and hostages until Baku "liberates" Nagorno Karabakh.

Baku has rejected maximalism and made a serious compromise, by agreeing to provide wide autonomy to the region. Now it is time for Armenia to reject maximalism and stop striving for formalization of the separation of Nagorno Karabakh from Azerbaijan. The trust can be restored if both parties have international guarantees of what concerns them - Armenian population of Nagorno Karabakh should not be deported or subjected to any discrimination, and the region should never be separated from Azerbaijan.

If these two postulates are accepted as a starting point by the parties and the co-chairing countries take a role of guarantors of non-violation of these basic principles, the trust between the parties will increase accelerating the conflict resolution.

The internal self-determination of the demilitarized Nagorno Karabakh, consisting of two communities, is a format, which is acceptable for everyone. This is the pipe of peace which Baku and Yerevan can smoke to ensure peaceful co-existence in the region. This formula rules out maximalism of the sides and offers mutual compromise and ensures inviolability of the principles, concerning each party. Yerevan should reject separation of Nagorno Karabakh from Azerbaijan by the Kosovo model and Baku in turn should reject forced resolution of the conflict and forced repatriation of Armenian population to Armenia by the model of Serbian Kraina. The model of a two-community Serbian-Hungarian Vojvodina with deployment of international peacekeeping forces can be probed in Nagorno Karabakh provided that it remains a part of Azerbaijan. Being members of the EU, recently joining Shengen and in the future the area of single European currently circulation, the issue of belonging of the southern areas of Slovakia, fully inhabited by ethnic Hungarians is not so urgent as it had been before joining the European Union. Few recall it in these two countries. With Romania's joining Shengen and the zone of European currency, issue of Hungarian speaking Transilvania will also lose its importance. The issue of Italian South Tirol, inhabited by ethnic Austrians, is also irrelevant today as integration made these issues unimportant.

The longer Armenia fails to trust the formula of internal self-determination of demilitarized Nagorno Karabakh, comprising two communities, the longer will the Nagorno Karabakh conflict remain unsettled and the more will our two countries be distanced from European integration, which would finally smooth this conflict.

/Day.Az/