Sabina Freizer: "The MG statement means in practice that there is no longer any internationally facilited negotiations format for the resolution of the NK conflict"

"ICG has prepared two reports last year in connection with the NK problem and gave many recommendations.

The first is "Nagorno Karabakh: Viewing the Conflict from the Ground aimed to describe the current situation in NK and the districts around it, and how IDPs from occupied lands are living in Azerbaijan".

The second report is "Nagorno Karabakh: A Plan for Peace focussed on the negotiations process". This report also included a long list of recommendations to the Azerbaijani and Armenian governments, to the de facto NK authorities, and to international organizations," Director of the Caucasus project of the International Crisis Group (ICG) Sabina Freizer has told APA in her exclusive interview.

According to her, the peace plan that they recommended in their second report was very close to what was on the table in the OSCE Minsk-Group facilitated talks: "As we can see from the statement made by the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs at the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna on 22 June, 2006, which describes the principles that were under discussion."

Stating the current situation with reagard to the conflict more critic, Sabina Freizer said that Azerbaijan and Armenia was more close to peace in the summer of 2005 than today: "Today I assess the situation as being very critical. I believe that the Azerbaijani and Armenian sides were much closer to an agreement in summer 2005 than they are today. There was much optimism until the Rambouillet meeting that there would be a peace agreement this year, that Armenian backed troops would begin withdrawal, and Azerbaijani IDPs would begin to return home during the second half of 2006 or in early 2007. This optimism has disappeared. Instead the co-chairs have stated that they are going to suspend their work."

Stating an attitude to the opinion of co-chairs' that responcibility for the settlement of the conflict lays on Presidents Sabina Freizer stated that the most important text to consider is the statement made by the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs at the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna on 22 June, 2006: "This statement provides a coherent and unified approach to the resolution of the conflict. It is perhaps the most open and critical statement the OSCE Minsk Group has ever made. It is also the first time since the start of the Minsk Group facilitated negotiations in 1994 that the co-chairs have said that they see no point in continuing their work. I am very surprised that few in Azerbaijan or in Armenia are commenting on this point. The Minsk Group statement means in practice that there is no longer any internationally facilited negotiations format for the resolution of the NK conflict.

What does this mean? Will the two sides manage to negotiate on their own without any third party mediation? Will another mediator appear? If the United States, Russia and France are giving up, what other international forces have the influence and authority to play a negotiator role? I don't believe that any new mediators will appear. Rather we are entering a very dangerous phase where there will be no peaceful negotiations between the sides. Again since 1994 this is the first time that we are in such a situation."

According to Sabina Freizer, during the past week the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan and Armenia have issued highly critical statements to each other: "I think that these clearly show the points of disagreement in the negotiations process. The Armenian side is insisting that the principles included a reference to the Lachin corridor, and to the right to self determination of the people of NK of their own status through a referendum. The Azerbaijani side is stating that the principles included liberalisation of the occupied territories, demilitarization of the conflict zone, and the return of all Azerbaijani IDPs. Yet these are precisely the points that the two sides continue to disagree on -- and why they were unable to sign a set of principles in Rambouillet and Bucharest.

The modalities of withdrawal from Lachin and Kelbajar and the modalities of a popular vote on the status of NK were not agreed upon by the sides. This is why the co-chairs recommended that they be addressed later -- in seperate working groups. But in the meantime they suggested that a peacebuilding process start with the withdrawal of Armenia backed troops of five districts -- to be followed by withdrawal from the other two -- and return of IDPs to their homes."

Calling this tragic eelement Sabina Freizer stated that in 2006 there was a chance for withdrawal to begin and return to start. All issues might not be resolved but a peace process would begin. Now there is no peace process. There is not even a negotiations process. Instead the Azerbaijani side is increasingly refering to the military option. If Azerbaijan decides to take offensive action against NK and Armenia, how many more years will it be before this conflict is resolved? How many more displaced persons and casualties will there be? How definite is it that Azerbaijan will get a better deal using the military option than what is on the table today?

The issue of the referendum on the status of Nagorno Karabakh is clearly one of the most sensitive points in the package that was being discussed. As the co-chairs state: for a withdrawal of Armenian backed forces from the occupied territories to begin, the sides would have to agree on the principle that a referendum will determine final status. But the precise modalities of this referendum would be discussed in further negotiations. Thus the key issue of debate between the Armenian and Azerbaijani side of who would participate in the referendum, where and when it would be held, would be decided upon later. The co-chairs add that the referendum could only occur "after suitable pre-conditions for such a vote have been achieved" which I consider to mean, after the return of displaced Azerbaijanis to NK. The international community is unlikely to use any other pressure mechanisms to encourage Armenia to withdraw from the occupied territories.