Prospects of Azerbaijan's military doctrine: problems and goals

Q: For many years already people in Azerbaijan have been talking about early adoption of a military doctrine. Some local media even said this would happen during the spring parliamentary session, but "the cart is still there." Obviously, they are also having problems with the declared formation of the Defense-Industrial Complex...

A: Now we have specific deadlines: the military advisor of the Azeri president, Gen. Vahid Aliyev has said that by the end of 2006 Milli Mejlis will adopt the long-awaited Military Doctrine. One must not dawdle with military doctrine for years. For example, Azerbaijan’s strategic partner Georgia was very quick in adopting a military doctrine – a document mentioning both possible enemy (it almost names it – "northern country") and strategic partners as well as clearly defining goals – integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Of course, we need a different military doctrine but we can't but envy Georgia's quickness.

One of the priorities of the Azeri president's policy is to form defense industry. For example, why buy arms and equipment abroad if one can arrange their licensed production at home? It is also time to decide what defense-industrial sphere will be given what priority depending on the long-term needs of the army and the mobilization needs of the state. The formation of Defense-Industrial Complex will allow local defense companies to transit from just surviving to developing, and the key prerequisite for this is the substantial increasse in military expenses due to high oil prices.

Quite recently the Ukrainian president decreed to increase the country's military expenses to $650 mln. Certainly, the formation of DIC will be good for the country's defense capacity and military security. Besides, as military challenges and the general geo-political situation in the "Big Caucasus" are getting increasingly specific, Azerbaijan is beginning to feel growing need for tougher requirements to the economic security parameters of its defense sector and for certain changes in its military-technical cooperation policies. However, in order to attain qualitative results in the military, the country needs a long-term program of reforms.

Q: What is the idea of the military reform the country has been planning for already a decade?

A: The idea is that it should embrace the whole defense system with the army reforms being just a part of it. The strategic plan of Azerbaijan's military reforms might have the following priorities: to urgently adopt a military doctrine — as even a lieutenant knows that military doctrine is a military constitution; to provide fundamental knowledge at military higher schools; to form a mobile regular organizational structure; to improve army technique and logistics; to recruit and train personnel; to democratize the military life; to ensure the social and legal security of military men and their families; to adapt military reforms to market economy conditions; to build the army with due regard for existing and possible military threats.

The military reform should consider the economic situation in the country, the acting legislation, the military budget, the forming military-industrial complex and the army strength. The strength and structure of the Azeri army should conform to the country's political, economic and other capabilities and, most importantly, with its foreign political priorities. The strategic objective of the military reform is to bring the Azeri army into conformity with the new Azeri statehood, political system and economy, with the content and the nature of the wars of XXI, with real and potential challenges to the national and regional interests and security of Azerbaijan. The concept of military reform should have the status of state program or, even, of law.

Q: I suppose, like in the case of other bills, the military reform concept will be unofficially presented by the concerned department, i.e. the defense ministry?

A: By no means. We must not allow the defense ministry to draft the concept "the way it likes". We won't be able to speak about any military reform until we decide our key problems: approve the concept of national security, specify key external and internal treats, create optimal system of army financing and re-equipment, draft new conscription law, overhaul the ruined system of reserve officer retraining and mobilization infrastructure, restore the system of sport-patriotic education of the youth.

Unless we resolve the above problems, all our good intentions to drastically reform the army will remain just good intentions, which, as you know, are a road to hell. We must stop demagogy about contract army. In the US this process took over 15 years and was fed by constantly growing military budget. Before launching military reforms we must, first and foremost, decide what functions the Defense Ministry and the General Staff should have, in what kind of subordination they should be to the president-the commander-in-chief, what specific forms of control the society and the parliament should exercise over the army. The military reform concept should fully comply with all acting laws and the military doctrine of Azerbaijan.

Neither reforms nor other political, social or economic reasons can or must prevent the country from fulfilling its duty to protect its own sovereignty and to keep high the fighting readiness of its soldiers and officers. The army has had and continues to have problems, but they are though slowly but being resolved due mostly to the officers for whom the concept "there is a profession to protect Homeland" has not lost its genuine meaning.

Q: The re-equipment of the Azeri army is a problem that can be easily solved if there is necessary money, but this medal has the other side. As the well-known author of Marxism-Leninism would say: personnel decide everything. Have they replaced the dismissed old commanders with people who can form really up-to-date units?

A: Some soldiers show much lower moral than military-technical development. The actions of some officers require moral consciousness, relations and practice as they are part of military policy. Indifference and passiveness lead to inertness and degradation, while low morality to deterioration of the military art. Rudeness and low professionalism are a big threat for the army – during war this results in big losses, during peace the incompetence, subservience and careerism of such soldiers cripple the fighting capacity of the army and damage its prestige. Many such officers go up very quickly and the higher ranks they get the more damage they cause to the army. Their injustice stains military prestige and spoils the health of their soldiers. The military policy cannot be effective if the rights of soldiers are violated. In order to make the military policy moral, the government, the parliament and the society should approach, analyze and control policies of the defense ministry from the viewpoint of morality.

Azerbaijan needs a fair mechanism of commander selection so as to have intellectual, professional and morally and psychologically prepared officers. One of the key criteria of selection, especially into headquarters, should be their fighting experience. As a rule, any defense reform should start from revision of officer recruitment, training and distribution tasks. These tasks cannot be solved without developing military and professional skills of young officers, but, at the same time, we should not "lose" experienced officers. We should improve the service conditions and order, prevent the untimely dismissal of experienced officers.

Unfortunately, there are still very many examples: Generals Talyb Mamedov and Yashar Aydamirov. It will take us many years ahead to examine the lessons of the Karabakh war, with all its achievements and failures. The fighting experience of many our officers should be fully used in our army and for our army, in the system of military and civil education, in military governance and personnel training.