|
|
The controversy between Vladimir Putin and Nikol Pashinyan
has become a notable episode in the current dynamics of Russian-Armenian
relations, but its significance goes far beyond the bilateral dialogue. In a
broader context, it reflects the increasing complexity of the geopolitical
configuration in the South Caucasus, where the interests of Russia, the West
and regional players intersect.
Against the background of what is happening, it is important
to take into account that Moscow and Yerevan have been building close economic
and energy ties for a long time. Russia remains Armenia's key partner in a
number of areas: natural gas supplies are carried out on preferential terms,
and trade between the two countries is showing steady growth, exceeding the $6
billion mark. The re-export factor also plays a significant role, thanks to
which Armenia is integrated into broader trade and economic chains.
Thanks to Russian re-exports, Armenia demonstrated the highest economic growth rates in the world during the first three years of the war in Ukraine. However, last year Yerevan actually refused to re-export Russian gold and precious stones to the UAE. As a result, Armenian exports to the UAE fell by almost 70 percent. And this is a big loss, considering that in 2024, imports from Russia more than doubled, and exports to the UAE increased by almost 7 times. After investigations of re-export schemes were published in the Western media, Yerevan decided to abandon such an instrument of economic growth.
In the context of a gradual "divorce" from Russia,
Armenia is increasing its trade turnover with the European Union. In 2025, the
foreign trade turnover with the EAEU countries amounted to $ 8 billion (a
decrease of 37 percent), with the EU countries - $ 2.5 billion (an increase of
more than 7 percent). In addition, the issue of the "Electric Grids of
Armenia", operated by Samvel Karapetyan's company, as well as the issue of
the Russian concession for Armenian railways, are on the agenda of the Armenian
authorities. Armenia is striving for change in both directions.
At the same time, by paying a visit to Moscow, Nikol
Pashinyan wants to show that he is not going to break off relations. At a
meeting with Vladimir Putin, the Armenian Prime Minister said this: Yerevan
knows that membership in both the EAEU and the EU is impossible, but it will
combine these two agendas as long as possible. When it becomes impossible,
Armenia will make a decision.
Meanwhile, Moscow, apparently, would like Yerevan to decide
now. At the meeting, Putin persistently explained to the guest that membership
in the two structures was impossible not even for political reasons, but for
economic reasons. He also recalled the significant difference in the price of
Russian gas for Europe and for Armenia. While gas prices in Europe already
exceed $600 per 1,000 cubic meters, Russia sells gas to Armenia at $177.5 per
1,000 cubic meters, Vladimir Putin pointedly reminded.
In 2025, the trade turnover between Russia and Armenia
amounted to 6.4 billion dollars. For comparison, it is 4.9 billion with
Azerbaijan. These figures were announced by the Russian president at a meeting
with Pashinyan.
Economists do not dispute that the traditional and close
EAEU market is more interesting and important for Armenia. When we talk about
the EAEU market, we mean, first of all, the Russian one. And here the issue of
priorities arises for Armenia. It is a difficult choice between economic and
political interests. The trend towards diversification of Yerevan's foreign
policy is becoming more and more noticeable. Armenia is stepping up contacts
with Western countries and institutions, which is perceived as part of a
broader strategy of balancing between different centers of power. This process,
in turn, inevitably leads to discussions about the future of allied relations
with Russia and the limits of a possible maneuver in foreign policy. Pashinyan
is acting cautiously, trying not to burn down old bridges until new ones are
built. Maintaining the balance would be beneficial for Armenia, but it could be
disadvantageous for Russia and the European Union themselves. In any case, the
rhetoric of the parties at the meeting makes it clear that Moscow does not
intend to share its former ally with anyone on equal terms. This is
geopolitics. As they say, nothing personal.
How the processes will develop will become clear after the
parliamentary elections in Armenia. Will current trends continue? It depends on
the domestic political context. If Nikol Pashinyan retains power, the western
trend will become even more noticeable. If pro-Russian forces come to power,
Yerevan will begin to restore relations with Moscow in full.
In the logic of competition between the West and Russia for
influence over Armenia, there is an increase in political tension in the
country, and foreign policy rhetoric is becoming part of the domestic political
competition. In this sense, the dialogue that took place in Moscow can be
considered not only as an element of interstate relations, but also as a factor
influencing electoral processes. Noteworthy here is Vladimir Putin's diplomatic
remark that Russia "has a lot of friends in Armenia... and there are many
political forces that are pro-Russian." And Russia would like them to have
the opportunity to participate in the elections. "Some, I know, are in
prison, despite the fact that they have a Russian passport."
Let's explain that we are talking about Russian businessman
Samvel Karapetyan, against whom a criminal case has been opened in Yerevan
under articles on calls to overthrow the government and financial fraud.
Karapetyan came to Yerevan from Moscow to organize a campaign in support of the
Armenian church and made anti-government appeals. The party he created
nominated Karapetyan as a candidate for prime Minister, while the Constitution
of the Republic of Armenia does not allow a citizen of another country to
participate in plebiscites. Despite this, Karapetyan is campaigning and
presenting an election program.
There is an opinion that Samvel Karapetyan is a creature of Moscow. The fact that the Russian president put in a good word for him confirms these assumptions to a certain extent. And it is particularly noteworthy that this was done publicly, and not in a one-on-one conversation between the two leaders.
Anyway, the upcoming elections in Armenia are already being
viewed by external actors as a tool of the geopolitical game. And not only
Moscow has its own interest here. In mid-March, the head of EU diplomacy, Kaya
Kallas, stated that the European Union, at the request of Armenia, would send a
special rapid reaction group to assist in countering hybrid threats ahead of
the elections in the country. No one doubts that "countering hybrid
conditions" involves taking measures to prevent the victory of pro-Russian
forces in the elections.
So June will be hot in Armenia. Including on the foreign
policy front.
As for Putin's remark, Pashinyan responded to it no less
diplomatically, saying that only those citizens who exclusively have an
Armenian passport can participate in the elections, "that is, with all due
respect, according to the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, people with
a Russian passport cannot be either candidates for deputies or candidates for
Prime Minister.ministers."
In the geopolitical game, the European side is more
restrained than the Russian side. This is not due to the "Nordic"
disposition, but to the current policy of Yerevan. Yerevan is leaning towards
the Western vector, and the EU does not need to try very hard. Hence, the
West's failure to use the traditional instrument of democracy and human rights
in its relations with Armenia. Not because these rights are not violated in
Armenia, but because there is no need to use the tool, since Yerevan is already
following the course needed by the West.
Nevertheless, despite the great geopolitical game, the wishes and interests of external players, Armenia has before its eyes the example of Azerbaijan, which has proved that only a course towards an independent and balanced foreign policy can bring success. Baku consistently builds pragmatic relations with various centers of power based on national interests and aspirations for sustainable development. Such a model of behavior in the context of increasing geopolitical turbulence is becoming an important element of the regional balance.
The established peace has also opened up an opportunity for
Armenia to assert its sovereignty, to become a self-sufficient unit that does
not seek any external associations. Yerevan's all-too-visible pro-European
aspirations are forcing it to slow down relations with Russia, just as in the
old days Armenia's pro-Russian policy knocked Western interests out of the
country's foreign policy field.
Nikol Pashinyan values relations with Baku. And on occasion,
it definitely demonstrates. This can be seen from the map of real Armenia
pinned on the lapel of his jacket even at official meetings, and, most
importantly, from the unequivocal rejection of the Karabakh movement. He loudly
announced the latter in Moscow. During the dialogue with the President of the
Russian Federation, the Armenian Prime Minister stated that the established
peace has a positive impact on Armenia's relations with Russia. Thus, the
opening of a direct railway connection with the Russian Federation
"strengthens our traditional economic ties, and this strengthens our ties
within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union."
The ongoing controversy between Moscow and Yerevan is not an
isolated diplomatic episode and should be viewed through the prism of the
current dynamics of geopolitical processes. The growing global rivalry around
the South Caucasus is becoming more noticeable as its geopolitical importance
increases. Under these conditions, Yerevan's relations with Moscow will affect
the region in the same way as Yerevan's relations with Brussels. Therefore, our
neighbor must be very attentive. And do not forget to look at Azerbaijan from
time to time. Baku has a lot to learn.
Print version