Scott Taylor: "You can find a number of serving British SAS types frequenting the Baku bars"

Christopher Deliso: We understand that you have just returned from your first trip to Azerbaijan. So, how is it that you went there? How long did you stay?

Scott Taylor: The trip came about as the result of an invitation from the Azeri embassy in Ottawa. They were aware of my extensive coverage of the Middle East - Iraq in particular, and they felt I might wish to broaden my scope a little. By happenstance I had some previous business arrangements lined up in Turkey at that juncture, so I was 'in the neighborhood' anyway so to speak. I was able to spend a week in Azerbaijan, met a lot of senior officials and generals and managed to get outside of Baku on one field trip into the south.

CD: Did you have some older, pre-existing idea about visiting the Caucasus? Or was this something out of the blue? How do you see Azerbaijan as fitting into the general network of places which you more regularly cover?

ST: To be honest, before going I had no real in-depth appreciation for the complex strategic, economic and political issues that envelop this former Soviet Republic. However, the Azeris are actually a Turkic people, and therefore historically connected to my old friends – the Turkmen of Iraq. So in reality, this was a natural extension of my journalistic 'trap-line' as opposed to a leap into a totally unrelated theatre.

CD: For readers to get some background on your trip, we add the link to your long article that appeared last week in the Canadian press, but we would still like to get any extra stories you may have left out of this piece here. Azerbaijan today is, like some of the Balkan countries you have covered in the past, not a war zone but a site of a frozen conflict. You spoke with refugees and regular people - so to what degree did you get the sense that the conflict is still close to the surface?

ST: Our field trip included visits to the refugee camps, and we were able to see firsthand a tiny fraction of the nearly 800,000 Azeris who were displaced during the Armenian offensives into Nagorno Karabakh from 1992-1994. As long as there is no effort made to permanently resettle these people, they are being used as political pawns to keep international pressure on the Armenians to withdraw from the occupied territories.

However, as it has been over a dozen years and no one has made any real attempt to enforce the UN Resolutions (which call upon Armenia to pull out their troops), the Azeris have upped the ante. Azerbaijan's army has sat in trenches surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh all this time, but now, as the oil boom kicks in and the economy starts to explode, the Azeris are starting to pump money into military hardware. I'm not sure how close the army is to mounting an offensive, but given the huge disparity in relative economies and population, this military buildup is bound to alarm the Armenians. As of next year, the Azeris will be spending as much simply on defense as the entire Armenian national budget!

CD: In your article, you spoke about the latest peace proposals from the Minsk Group about Nagorno Karabakh. There have been many peace proposals over the years, so many that one gets the sense that few believe in even the possibility of a breakthrough plan anymore. What about this time? Did you sense any popularity or expectations among the people?

ST: After 12 years of ceasefire and zero progress towards a settlement, the expectation of a negotiated agreement is about zilch. The Nagorno Karabakh issue was a tremendous blow to Azeri nationalist pride, and now that their country is expanding their economy so quickly, the young people want to see some results militarily. It is a dangerous combination when you fuel injured pride with huge oil profits being used to bolster a one-sided regional arms race.

CD: How important is an initial Armenian troop pullout for the Azeri side, as a show of good faith in advance of any final solution?

ST: I think the very first step to any resolution is the pullout of Armenian troops from at least the seven occupied Azeri provinces which surround the Nagorno Karabakh region. After Armenian troops had secured the disputed territory in 1992 and expelled the 40,000 ethnic Azeris, they continued to clear a large buffer zone. In the process of establishing this occupied defensive perimeter, approximately 800,000 Azeris were ethnically cleansed out of areas in which they constituted the overwhelming majority. So even if a final resolution on the status of Nagorno Karabakh remains elusive, the Azeris want those seven occupied provinces returned immediately.

CD: From the people you spoke with in, specifically, the government, what was their sense that a real breakthrough on the Nagorno Karabakh issue might be in the offing? What would it take?

ST: I think that a military option is something which the Azeri government is trying desperately to add to the bargaining equation. Their military commanders warn of losing their patience and top politicians brag about their huge new defence budget. Foreign diplomats based in Baku are not alarmed at this stage as they see the Azeri arms buildup as mostly bluff. "When they start buying helicopter gunships we'll know they [the Azeris] are getting serious" is what one US spokesman explained to me.

However, now that the government has signed that huge 'Deal of the Century' oil contract with British Petroleum, and opened the strategically important Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, I think the political worm is turning in favour of the Azeris. It may be the hollow threat of renewed military action which causes Azerbaijan's new found strategic ‘friends’ to exert the necessary pressure on Armenia to begin a withdrawal.

CD: You mention the cult of personality of the former leader, Heydar Aliyev. Is this something that could be compared with, say, Tito in Yugoslavia? To what extent do you think that it is something spontaneously sustained, from the hearts of the people, or to what extent do you see it as a ploy of Aliyev's son (the current ruler) to retain power? Or is it none of the above?

ST: I think it is more in the Azeris' desire to create a Kemal Ataturk figure as a national symbol, who would stand above day-to-day politics and corruption. Once such individuals are immortalized in such a mythical manner, their legend only continues to grow. For Ilham Aliyev it is both a blessing and a curse, as he will always rule in his father’s 'larger-than-life' shadow.

CD: There is also a tight bond between the Azeris and their “big brothers” in Turkey. To what extent did you notice this? Turkey has not opened the border with Armenia because of the unresolved Nagorno Karabakh issue. Would Turkey come to the direct military assistance of Baku in case of new fighting?

ST: During the heavy fighting in 1992-1994 there were Turkish advisors on the ground assisting the Azeris. In the early stages of that fighting, Azerbaijan got thumped pretty good by a Russian-backed Armenian defence force. However, by 1994 the regrouped Azeris (with Turkish help) had begun to turn the tide.

Azerbaijan's army is rapidly trying to bring itself up to NATO standard, and the Turks have been instrumental in overseeing this transition. I think the only time that Turkey would intervene directly against Armenia would be if the isolated Azeri province of Netchevan was threatened. This tiny region is administered by Baku, is populated entirely by ethnic Azeris, borders on Turkey but sits surrounded by Armenian-controlled territory. In 1992-1994, the Turks made it clear to Armenia that this was a no-go zone- or else 'big brother' Turkey would jump into the fray with both feet.

CD: One of the things that comes across in your article is the whole 'Star Wars' nature of the lifestyle for expatriate oil workers/mercenaries/etc. Share with us some colorful stories about the characters you encountered. Who are these people? I imagine that most of those men must have had some form of previous military training?

ST: Chris, I don't scare easily, but some of these characters were downright frightening. Most of the oil workers are former British soldiers... mostly special forces or paras, and invariably they had seen real combat in either the Falklands, Northern Ireland or in either of the last two rounds of the Gulf Wars.

There were also a number of serving SAS types frequenting the Baku bars, and one quickly knows enough not to ask them why they're in town. Although I suppose that some of them are also keenly interested in keeping an eye on Azerbaijan's southern neighbor, Iran.

Such individuals naturally attract the attentions of certain classes of women anxious to, er, milk their own share of the oil boom. In some of the ex-pat bars you could find a bizarre collection of these 'ladies' from all over the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia. Alcohol is a huge part of the oil workers' routine, and between that and the hard living they've endured, these guys age fast. Some of them in their mid-forties looked at least 70...but still frightening, mind you.

CD: Russian President Vladimir Putin has stated that Kosovo independence for the Albanians would mean universal principles for self-determination across the board- including in places like the Caucasus. Did you get any sense of Russian involvement or potential involvement in the Nagorno Karabakh issue on behalf of Armenia, if Kosovo becomes independent and they are able to push the precedent?

ST: The Russians are not too pleased with Azerbaijan for selling off shared Caspian Sea oil rights to BP, and for opening the BTC pipeline. This now constitutes a conduit whereby the Central Asian petroleum resources do not have to transit to Europe via Russia. Consequently, Russia's support for Armenia is not entirely selfless. Furthermore, as the US-allied Georgians continue to push local Russian military bases out, Armenia offers a solution to Moscow for maintaining a military footprint on this strategic fault-line.

CD: That said, in a world where sudden new challenges in the Middle East are now manifesting, has the danger of future conflict in Azerbaijan (or around it) now been heightened or lessened? Is it a case of the country wanting to be on its best behavior to keep the West happy, or is it perhaps an 'anything goes' situation, now that everyone is so preoccupied with Iran and Lebanon?

ST: The Iran issue is the most pressing one, in that approximately 17 million ethnic Azeris live inside the Iranian border. The territory of Azerbaijan was originally divided by Tsarist Russia and Persia back in 1828. The 8.5 million Azeris residing in the independent former Soviet Republic are just the tip of a big iceberg. I have been told that the CIA is hoping to use Azerbaijan's newfound prosperity and freedoms to incite Azeri nationalism south of their border. Constituting one-third of Iran's population, any separatist movement on the part of the Azeris would deeply destabilize the Tehran regime. Not that America ever plays such games, of course...

CD: Finally, considering that you were visiting Azerbaijan as part of a press junket, do you feel that you were presented with the real situation completely? Are there aspects of the Armenian issue that may have been overlooked, or that you might like to put caveats around until you can see the situation from their point of view?

ST: It is never possible to see a 'complete' picture from only one vantage point. Unlike many of our media colleagues who thump their chests and claim to 'know' an issue, I always present my findings as what they are...one piece of the puzzle. I look forward to getting more acquainted with the Armenian side of the conflict, and I can't wait to actually visit the disputed territory of Nagorno Karabakh to see things for myself in the near future.

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