
APA’s Washington DC correspondent’s interview with Thomas Ambrosio, US analyst on South Caucasus issues, an Associate Professor of political science at North Dakota State University.
Two weeks after the meeting
between Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents that organized by Russia how
would you describe the significance of Karabakh negotiation process?
And what do you expect from it?
I have very, very low expectations. The central problem is that
nothing has changed: the positions of the two sides have not changed,
the situation on the ground has not changed, and the international
environment has not changed. Given that we are coming up on two decades
since this conflict entered its frozen stage, I find it amusing that
before every summit there is optimism expressed by politicians,
activists, and the press that ‘this is the one’ to break the impasse.
This conflict is frozen for a reason: the positions of the two sides
are mutually incompatible. They are stuck in a zero-sum game: if
Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty is recognized, then
Nagorno-Karabakh would have to give up its de facto independence and
Armenia would have to relinquish its de facto Greater Armenia; if
Nagorno-Karabakh’s de facto independence was made de jure, then
Azerbaijan would lose a large swath of its territory and its territorial
integrity will be called into question. I see neither how this impasse
can be broken nor do I see a reason for the perpetual pre-summit
optimism – the latter just seems like wishful thinking.
One meeting after another, the Armenian side isn’t taking a
constructive position, according to Azerbaijani officials. What is the
way out for Azerbaijan?
There is nothing that can be done. Again, the positions of the two
sides are incompatible. Unless something changes significantly (the
positions of the sides, the situation on the ground, or the
international environment) I do not see any offer that the Azeris could
make that would be acceptable to both themselves and the other side.
Is there any possibility that the US will take a more active role in the conflict adjustment, following Russia?
It will change nothing, unless it represents a change in the international environment, which it won’t. Like the positions of the two parties directly affected by the conflict,
the American position has not changed and will likely not change any
time in the future. Plus, to be brutally honest, the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict has a rather low priority within the administration, given the
other international and domestic crises either present or on the
horizon. Therefore, I do not see anything different coming out of an
American-led meeting than a Russian one or any other forum for that
matter.
How on the whole do you see the future of the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiation process?
I would say that this is does not seem like a negotiation process in
any real sense. Maybe something different is going on behind closed
doors, but from the outside it appears that these meetings are an
internationally-required ritual in which the hosts get to pretend to
play the role of ‘peacemaker’ and the two sides get together because
they have to or else they will be seen as warmongers. Then the two
sides present their well-known, mutually-incompatible positions to each
other – as they have at countless meetings beforehand.
Then they go
home to blame the other for the impasse, while the hosts say something
to the effect that it was a good airing of views, but are disappointed
by the lack of progress. I have no doubt that the successors of the
current Minsk Group presidents (Obama, Medvedev, Sarkozy) will have
their representatives facing the same set of issues with little to no
progress. However, it must be said that the
current situation is better than having the two sides shooting at each
other. Talking is better than shooting, so, in that sense, the parties
and the external mediators will continue the diplomatic ritual.
/APA/