Cory Welt: It was a major mistake for the U.S. not to link Karabakh problem with Armenian-Turkish rapprochement

It seems that U.S. forgot the Karabagh settlement and has changed it for support Armenia by various means (economic assistance, pushing Armenian-Turkish border issue etc). Is it happen because of influence of Armenian lobby or there are any other reasons?
 
The Obama administration has not really adopted a more “pro-Armenian” position than previous governments – this is a misperception. U.S. administrations have all more or less worked from the same “playbook.” Armenian-Turkish rapprochement was promoted, in part, out of a genuine belief this kind of dramatic (peaceful) shift in context would have the potential to unfreeze the conflict resolution process over Nagorno-Karabakh. It was a major mistake not to talk about this linkage more, engage Azerbaijan on the issue, persuade Armenia to take the linkage seriously, and jointly to develop this idea into some concrete suggestions.

Russia and Turkey has been developing a close collaboration, especially during the last 2 years. What is your opinion, may this collaboration be fruitful for the stability in the South Caucasus region?
 
Such a collaboration could be fruitful for stability in the South Caucasus, but only if Turkey approaches the problem from the position of both regional power and Euro-atlantic ally. I don’t think much good will come of Turkish-Russian collaboration in the Caucasus that does not take place within the context of broader European security discussions and the continued development of European-Caucasus relations.

Some experts agree, that the West is more and more losing its positions on the post Soviet space... Can the Russian activity be expected to increase?
 
First, recent history has demonstrated to us that policy shifts in the post-Soviet space are cyclical. This is most clearly the case in Ukraine but it is relevant for other states as well. Second, a problem with this formulation is that most policymakers in the West, at least, have never conceived of regional politics as a “fight” with Russia. There are perfectly imaginable scenarios in which states of the region have improved relations with Russia and still maintain very close relations to Europe and the United States, particularly in the case of Moldova and Georgia, where societies and leaders have not at all turned away from the West. This is a long-term process and we should not be so focused on what appear to be dramatic short-term changes. 
 
In Azerbaijan, the same thing could be said. Of course, Russia is developing a more active “soft power” policy toward all states of the region (as well as throughout Europe), and it should be no surprise that Azerbaijan is receptive to offers that are in its interest or those of its leadership. I don’t think this means that Azerbaijan is seeking a permanent transformation of its foreign policy orientation.
 
Moscow says that it CIS countries to decide to be a member of EU and NATO or not. Do you think that Russia might agree with membership of Azerbaijan or even Georgia in NATO?
 
The issue of NATO enlargement into the Caucasus is not as pressing as it once was. The promise of NATO membership to Georgia, and implicitly to Azerbaijan, remains, but this is now an even longer-term process than it was before the Russian-Georgian war. The greatest chance for membership will lie with the development of stable, democratic states. Russia is unlikely to consent to NATO membership for Azerbaijan and Georgia, but that won’t necessarily be the deciding factor. However, there are many possible security arrangements for the Caucasus (and Ukraine and Moldova), and it would be good to at least begin a serious discussion about what the available options are that can truly provide security to all these states currently stuck between NATO and the CSTO.


/Day.Az/