Azerbaijani political expert: Negotiations to resolve Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are at finish line

Is the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict likely to be resolved in 2010, especially in the first decade of the year?

Already in the second half of 2009, co-chais of the OSCE Minsk Group made statements about possibility of reaching agreement on basic principles of the conflict resolution in the coming months. Although it did not happen, these statements indicate that the talks are at the finish line.

Apparently, 2010 will clarify final fate of the "Prague Process" and the so-called "Madrid principles". There is possibility to delay the agreement and repeat these long-known conditions over and over again for couple of months, or six months. But in 2010 one needs to expect either singing of an agreement or formal recognition that " Prague process" failed giving no results.

In the meantime, there is favorable international environment around the negotiation process and co-chairs act coherently and consistently while socio-economic situation in Armenia strongly necessitates normalization of relations with its neighbors, without which the economic prospects of the country, to put it mildly, are vague. There are still skepticism about prospects of reaching agreement about basic principles in the first half of 2010.

Many internal and external factors are pushing Armenia to necessary compromises, but in fact, Yerevan believes that it is easier to push normalization of relations with Turkey through public opinion than with Azerbaijan despite almost century-old propaganda of the enemy image for Turks and accusations of the so-called "genocide"! It should be borne in mind that when the so-called "Prague process" started, there was no indication that this process can result in a breakthrough and agreement. Armenia viewed it as the next stage of simulation of the negotiation process and prolonging the situation in the occupied territories.

Consequences of the Russian-Georgian August war and the global economic crisis have changed the situation in the region in the middle of "low-intensity" Prague process. Russia came up with a real motivation to reach a settlement, and Armenia, following decline of per capita GDP by almost 20 percent in 2009 and dim prospects for economic future, is obliged to urgently seek ways of restoring economic relations with its neighbors. Therefore, Armenia has been taken aback. The situation is completely different than it was in the beginning of the "Prague process". Armenia faces a very difficult choices.

Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan has stated that Armenia is ready to ratify the Armenia-Turkey protocols. Do you believe the protocols will be ratified and borders be opened till April 24, the next anniversary of the so-called “Armenian genocide”?

As some kind of time-frame for achieving a breakthrough in Turkish-Armenian relations, April 24 is usually viewed in the context that the Armenian lobby in the U.S. Congress threatens that a resolution recognizing the so-called "genocide" can be adopted till that date. Although this is a very sensitive moment the Turkish diplomacy, I think that there is underestimation of Turkey’s independence in making important foreign policy decisions.

Once despite massive pressure of all branches of the United States government, Turkey refused to allow its territory to be used for military purposes against Iraqi thus questioning relationship of the strategic alliance with the United States. Today Americans are obliged to admit that Turkey was right. It was the previous Washington administration that made a mistake.

Therefore, it is a clear mistake to assume that the Armenian lobby in the U.S. Congress may force Turkey to adopt a rush decision contradicting country’s interests. Moreover, it became clear in recent months that opening the border with Armenia depends entirely on other factors. It is already known that resolution of the Karabakh conflict and normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations are two sides of a coin.

They can be formally pulled apart under various diplomatic formats. However, there will be either parallel breakthroughs in both issues or the situation will remain "frozen" in both directions. So, prospects of achieving those breakthroughs depend on the answer to one question - what was Armenia’s aim when it initiated the process of Turkish-Armenian normalization?

In your opinion, what was Armenia’s real goal?

It certainly will not work if Yerevan aims at driving a wedge in the Turkish-Azerbaijani relations, to get Turkey to change its stance on resolving the Karabakh conflict, opening of Turkish-Armenian border, beginning of economic cooperation with Turkey without any compromise in the Karabakh conflict and withdrawal from the occupied territories.

In this case, we will see no opening of the Turkish-Armenian border and no breakthrough in resolving the Karabakh conflict. But if Yerevan is aimed normalizing relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan and securing peace and stability in the region when it initiated the protocols, we may witness breakthroughs in both directions.

Yerevan has not given a clear answer to this question yet. It is unclear whether the initiative was part of Yerevan’s political intrigue, or it really wants peace and stability in the region.

Acting fairly consistently in terms of normalizing ties with Turkey, it still keeps on blocking success in settlement of the Karabakh conflict which raises serious questions in Ankara and Baku and around the world about true objectives of Armenia's policy. Armenia’s attitude to compromise on resolution of the conflict has become a kind of "litmus paper" on which prospects for normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations depend.

N. Abdullayeva