Towards long-awaited breakthrough: resolving Karabakh conflict – no results with surviving hopes

The year 2009 is nearing end. Contrary to expectations, this year did not brought long-awaited breakthrough in the peaceful settlement of Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. But is unfair to call negotiations imitation and mediating efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group – failure. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev gave an adequate assessment of the situation in his recent interview with a Russian TV channel. He described this year in terms of the settlement "... as a positive, but less positive than it might be", adding that "... we hope it will be possible to agree on the basic positions in 2010, but we oppose that negotiation will become a permanent process.”

What the year 2009 was noted for in the context of the settlement of the Karabakh conflict? First of all, perhaps, for intensified negotiation process. The presidents of the conflicting parties held six meetings. The foreign ministers met more often. The co-chairs of the Minsk group visited the region together or individually almost every month sometimes making the shuttle visits between Baku and Yerevan.

The support for a peaceful settlement was not limited to efforts of Special representatives of Minsk Group co-chairing countries. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev directly participated in the three Armenian-Azerbaijani summit meetings. At the G-8 summit in L’Aquila (Italy), Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, United States President Barack Obama and French President Sarkozy issued a joint statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 17th meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting held in Athens in December supported a statement by the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as foreign ministers of France, Russia and U.S. Undersecretary of State which said efforts to resolve the Karabakh conflict on the basis of three principles of the Helsinki Final Act - non-use or threat of force, equality and self-determination of peoples and territorial integrity - was continuing.  

Without exaggerating importance of this document, I draw attention to the fact that for the first time the Armenian side agreed to the document which called for resolving the Karabakh conflict under territorial integrity. To be more exact, ten years ago Armenia refused to accede to the document which stipulated self-determination for Nagorno-Karabakh in the context of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity at the OSCE summit in Lisbon. Even in last year's Mein Dorf Declaration on political settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict signed by the presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia, due to conflicting approaches of the conflicting parties they had to refer to general principles and norms of international law and decisions and documents adopted in this framework.

Negotiations were difficult and tough throughout 2009. The parties made strides not only forward but backward, returning to matters that seemed to be earlier coordinated. Presumably, the parties have agreed on a phased withdrawal of Armenian forces from occupied areas outside Nagorno-Karabakh. Baku also signaled that it does not object to a corridor linking Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. Evidence is a visit of a special mission to the Lachin region to review possible route and secure width of the corridor. The issue of "interim status" also saw some progress, but a possibility to reconcile positions of the sides on the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh, or rather, a mechanism for determining have been elusive.

Azerbaijan insists that regardless of the will of the Nagorno-Karabakh people, the legal power has been and should rest with Azerbaijan, and, consequently, one can speak only about extent of autonomy and self-government. Armenia required not to set boundaries for the will of the Nagorno-Karabakh people (referring to the Armenian majority) seeking to legalize secession from Azerbaijan through the referendum. Offering a to define status of Nagorno-Karabakh through mechanism of a delayed referendum, the Minsk Group co-chairs want to simultaneously solve the difficult question of establishing cooperation between Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh separatists with Azerbaijan.

Armenians are interested in such cooperation to a great degree. Even if to assume hypothetically that the great powers recognize secession of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan, no one can force Azerbaijan to cooperate with Armenia. Deferred referendum to determine the permanent status allows the mediating powers to push Baku to appease the Armenian side with economic preferences, to demonstrate its willingness to forget the past in every possible way, open communications and to make investments in the hope that the Armenians will vote for a referendum to remain within the borders of Azerbaijan.
 
However, we have closely studied history and behavioral patterns of Armenians which leave no room for illusions about their "gratitude and prudence." So, attempts to catch Baku in a trap of referendum failed. Therefore, in response to requirement to formulate a question about will of the people in the most general form and to postpone it for a long-term perspective, Yerevan once again raised the issue of a "transitional status".

Armenians want to fill in details which in practice means formation of de facto independence of Nagorno-Karabakh without declaring it. Since, "transitional status" in the Armenian interpretation is identical to independence to be consolidated with international agreements and guarantees. Nevertheless, one can try find a balance and to reach a mutually acceptable compromise on the timing and time of a referendum on one hand and the scope of powers defined by "transitional status" on the other.

Meanwhile, mediators hope to move the negotiating process forward. The official websites of the OSCE and the American White House released part of the the Madrid Principles in summer to make public aware of them. The co-chairs began to meet more with the leaders of public opinion, NGO activists, representatives of political parties and the media and to inform on the state of settlement of the Karabakh conflict. Foreign donors began to fund more projects that involve contacts and dialogue between civil society representatives of the conflicting parties. The noteworthy is that Russia initiated the meeting of parliamentarians from Armenia and  Azerbaijan, later media leaders and later that of independent experts and NGO leaders.

To prevent Armenian separatists monopolize the right to speak on behalf of the Nagorno-Karabakh, finally steps were taken to strengthen and grant an official status to the Azerbaijani community of Karabakh. It is important to give an impetus to this community to ensure its voice will be loudly sounded in Azerbaijan and abroad.

Negotiations within the Minsk Group are in homestretch. It is hard to protract them indefinitely  in a bid extend the existing status quo. Azerbaijan is developing and growing while Armenia is stagnating amid a blockade. The burden of sustaining its economy, finances and armaments, which falls primarily on Russia is becoming harder.

An attempt to play against Azerbaijan a card of “historical Armenian-Turkish reconciliation” developed by Armenians and sponsored by their patrons failed. It true goal was to break the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance to cause confusion and to persuade Azerbaijan to make concessions, leading to secession of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan’s leaders showed firmness, but the Turkish government, after a little hesitation, unequivocally confirmed that without progress in the settlement of the Karabakh ratification conflict, Armenian-Turkish protocols will not be ratified and borders between the two countries will not open. Moreover, Armenia and Turkey have signed a deal according to which Turkey will provide assistance and help strengthen defense capacity of Azerbaijan.

In these circumstances, there is only one way to avoid complications of war in the region which greatly increases the risk in case the negotiations fail – to bring Armenia to reason so that it will lower its territorial ambitions. Hardness, realism and reliance on interests rather than history and emotion leaves a chance to implement long-awaited breakthrough in the negotiations within the OSCE Minsk Group in the coming year.

Rasim Musabayov, political expert