American Radar Systems, Russian Bases and National Armed Forces: The State of Military Affairs in the Southern Caucasus

What must one see behind this dizzying rise in military expenditures by the Georgians? The Georgian authorities claim that it is linked to the reforms the country is undertaking to integrate into NATO. Some international capitals, particularly Moscow, object that Tbilisi's intention is to launch an armed reconquest of the secessionist regions of Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia. One day after the publication of SIPRI's report, the Russian minister of defense, Sergei Ivanov, in no way failed to highlight that the significant augmentation of Georgian military expenditures elicited an "incontestable worry."

Today, the Georgian defense budget totals 397.4 million laris (178 million euros), approximately 3% of the GDP. Georgia's defense budget also receives important aid from the United States and NATO.

Reforming Georgian Defense

In terms of defense, it is with a loud voice that the Georgian government formulates itsthree main objectives. The first is to facilitate the process of integration with NATO. "Our ultimate goal is to equip the country with permanent armed forces and forces which are interoperable with the Alliance's other units in order to contribute to international peace-keeping operations," said Mamuka Kudava, the Georgian vice-minister of defense, recalling immediately that 8% of the Georgian armed forces are currently mobilized in peacekeeping operations.

A second target in the Georgian ministry of defense's line of sight is the reformation of its system of management. For Mr. Kudava, this means "using our logistical, financial and human resources efficiently, and rendering the decision making and implementation process more effective." One example of the reforms underway is that the Georgian defense ministry is giving its officer corps a face lift. The actual command structure, inherited from the Soviet era, will be progressively remodeled in order to equip the country with an officer corps interarmed to NATO standards.

Trained and Equipped

The third and final declared objective of the ministry is to improve the combat capacities of its armed forces. Any question of equipment and training cannot fail to remind one that from May 2002 to April 2004, Georgia benefited from the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), a program financed by the United States and led by American instructors, which sought to form battalions of Georgian soldiers for the 'War on Terror.'

"Contrary to what some people were able to write, the goal of the program was not simply to form a small group of Georgian soldiers capable of assuring the protection of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum (BTE) pipelines and their maritime approaches. The arrangement undertaken by the United States goes well beyond that. It is very much a heavy rearrangement of all of the components of the Georgian army including transforming infantry troops into special forces, made up by armored units as well as police, customs and security services," explains Cyrille Gloaguen, a specialist in military issues and Russian security at l'Institut Fransais de Geopolitique and a former collaborator with the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) from 1998 to 2000.

A New Military Base in Senaki

As the crowning event of 2006 and the ultimate pride of the Georgian defense, the inauguration of the military base at Senaki in western Georgia will have made some noise. Begun in 2005, the construction of this new base conforming to NATO standards will not be completed until the end of 2006. The total cost? According to the figures given by the Georgian authorities, the cost will reach 35 million laris (15.6 million euros).

Following its launch, the Saakashvili administration plans to open a similar building site in the coming months at Gori in central Georgia. "The construction of this base will be launched in 2006," confirms Mr. Kudava.

In the eyes of numerous international observers, the location of these bases is not insignificant. At a minimum, it raises questions and doubts because the Senaki base is situated only 40 kilometers from the border with separatist Abkhazia. The base in Gori will be separated from Tskhinvali, the capital of the secessionist republic of Southern Ossetia, by only some thirty kilometers.

Even if Tbilisi pleads for a peaceful resolution to these separatist conflicts, it is an undeniable fact that these two bases are as many negative signals for the two unrecognized republics of Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia. Although the construction of these bases does not fit into a military project of restoring the integrity of Georgian territory, Abkhazians and Southern Ossetians give little credit to the declared intentions of the Georgian government.

Abkhazian and Southern Ossetian Defense

Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia are equipped with de facto ministers of defense, armed forces and police forces. These structures are not recognized by the international community and are consequently categorized as paramilitaries. In addition, in these two separatist regions actual armed paramilitary groups are evolving which are not, or practically are not, under the control of the local authorities. Finally, both Tskhinvali and Sukhumi have the ability to mobilize a large portion of the male population in case of a threat or for exercises.

But it is difficult to evaluate the latter group with precision. For Southern Ossetia, estimates range between 2,000 and 6,000 men. Concerning Abkhazia, one can retain that the last two military exercises conducted in March and April 2006 mobilized 4,000 and 5,000 men respectively, including reservists.

The Russian peacekeeping forces deployed in Abkhazia are comprised of 1,300 men. In Southern Ossetia, the battalions of joint peacekeeping forces are made up by 500 Russian soldiers to which 500 Northern Ossetians and 300 Georgians are adjoined.

The Departure of Russian Soldiers from Georgia

Back to Georgia. Although it was largely publicized, the two building sites at Senaki and Gori, one nearly completed and the other in the planning stage, will not have stolen the thunder from the national military agenda's major push: the retreat of Russian troops from Georgia.

In Moscow in 2005, the then Georgian minister of foreign affairs, Salome Zurabishvili, demanded the closure of the two Russian bases on Georgian territory (in Batumi and Akhalkalaki) and the process is under way today. The Russian base at Akhalkalaki which will definitively close its doors at the end of 2007 will be completely emptied of its heavy equipment and weapons between now and the end of 2006.

In mid-June, ten infantry combat vehicles (BMP), a reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM) as well as a light armored troop transport vehicle (MT-LB) left the Akhalkalaki base in order to be put into use in Russia via Azerbaijani territory. Five Kamaz armed with 100mm canons also left the base in the direction of Armenia where the arms will be stocked on the Russian military base at Gioumri (in western Armenia).

From Conscripts to Professionals

Another thread to follow is the professionalization of the Georgian army. Today 60% of the country's armed forces, which totaled 17,500 men in 2005, are comprised of volunteers. According to the Georgian minister of defense, Irakli Okruashvili, conscripts will be completely replaced with professionals by 2009. This will be a heavy and expensive reform and it will see the light of day only if the ministry in question undertakes the difficult task of rapidly and completely introducing reforms which will improve the management of the armed forces. This includes, notably, playing the budgetary transparency card.

For now, Georgian observers maintain that projects like the opening of the base at Senaki are necessary to follow the road which leads to NATO membership. But a strong army starts with well nourished soldiers. As expected, the ministry categorically rejects this type of accusation, arguing mainly that salaries have been "augmented in a significant way since 2004", brandishing even "an average raise of 250%." Critics of the living conditions of Georgian conscripts in barracks regularly dismiss this argument.

Russian Bases in Armenia

In the neighboring republic of Armenia which the frozen Nagorno Karabakh conflict has pitted against Azerbaijan for more than ten years, Pavel Safarian, the vice-minister of the economy and finances, recently announced a sensible increase in the defense budget for 2007. 34% of the state budget will be earmarked for defense, totaling approximately 90 billion drams (172 million euros). In 2004, the defense budget in Armenia was 78 million euros, as opposed to 108 million euros in 2005 and 131 million euros in 2006.

Members of the Armenian armed forces totaled 45,000 men in 2005, of which 41,500 were ground troops. On the other hand, nobody can ignore the presence of Russian troops from the Southern division of the Group of Russian forces in the Transcaucasus (GRVZ; approximately 4,500 men) which assures the protection of the country's borders under the auspices of the CIS's collective security agreement.

American Radar Systems

On the Azerbaijani side, the authorities shy away from communicating about the sensible subject of defense. Figures vary and Baku cultivates the imprecision. The country's armed forces will mobilize 67,000 people, of which 57,000 are for the sole ground army. According to figures from the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the defense budget will reach 470 million euros this year, as opposed to 247 million euros in 2005 and 195 million euros in 2004. And oil revenues could allow for a considerable augmentation of the military portfolio for 2007. But once again, it is hazardous to give exact figures about Azerbaijan. According to the numbers published by the Institut de Relations Internationales et Strategiques (IRIS) in its Annee Strat?gique 2006, the military budget of Azerbaijan reached 124 million Euros in 2005.

Outside of these military expenditures, Azerbaijan has attracted international attention for the agreement which links it to the United States. The agreement concerns the installation of American radar systems on its soil, one 20 kilometers north of the Iranian border in southern Azerbaijan and the other north of Baku, near the Russian border.

For Oksana Antonenko, director of the Russia-Eurasia program at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, these radar systems "have the official objective of controlling contraband, including the likely traffic of weapons of mass destruction via the Caspian sea."

"However, it is clear that the technical characteristics and the location of these radar systems near the Iranian and Russian borders could allow them to assemble information and monitor northern Iran and the eastern portion of the Russian North Caucasus – two particularly unstable regions," insists Ms. Antonenko. "These radar systems could also control other activities in the Caspian sea, such as activities of a military type, which have increased considerably with the steady militarization of the Caspian."

A Reinforced Cooperation Between Baku and Washington

It seems that in this affair, the American interests are evident. But why has the Ilham Aliev regime accepted this military agreement? "I believe that the agreement must be considered in the larger context of Baku's projects which aim to reinforce military relations with Washington?- which partially explains the need to counterbalance the developing Russian military presence in Armenia?- and in terms of the more pressing need of the Azerbaijanis to pull a profit from their partnership with the Americans," maintains the expert. "The policy of balance which Azerbaijan is judiciously playing in developing good relations with the United States, Russia and Iran guarantee that its military cooperation with Washington will not undermine its relations with its two important neighbors. One must note however that Russia is less preoccupied by military links, potential and real alike, tying Baku to Washington than by the military cooperation displayed between Georgia and the United States."

Although it is less visible, the military cooperation between Washington and Baku is developing. A revealing sign was in Baku where, at Washington's initiative, a conference of non-proliferation in the Black and Caspian seas was held in the autumn of 2005. For the occasion, marine officers from the coastal countries of the two seas were reunited under the auspices of a fictional exercise to oppose a fictional state baptized "The Purple Republic", suspected of terrorist activities and of detonating a nuclear weapon. No particular state was targeted. The only certainty is the callous one following: Of the coastal states convened to participate in the exercise, only Russia and Iran were absent.

By Celia Chauffour

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