Turkish-American economic relations and the Armenian issue

So wrote Edward Joy Morris, "Minister to Turkey," to Secretary of State William E. Seward in 1861, after his initial audience with the sultan. In 1862, the Turkish grand vizier gave tangible support to the Union position by issuing a decree interdicting entrance into Ottoman waters and ports of privateers operating against US shipping. In 1865, Mr. Joy commented on the joyful excitement created in Turkey by General Grant's victories at Petersburg and Richmond and the sadness following President Lincoln’s assassination. (R. Trask (1971), The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform 1914- 1939, The University of Minnesota Press)

Early relations between the US and the Ottoman Empire were cordial and supportive. The bulk of the relationship centered around commerce and missionary activities. Until World War I, tangible results of these relations were a trade surplus in favor of the Ottoman Empire and many missionary schools, including Robert College.

In the post-World War II period, major aspects of that picture changed significantly. Turkey, now a smaller country, gained political importance during the Cold War: It was the "standard bearer of the free world" and possibly the only major army in the East that could selflessly fight the communist monsters -- as they did with US soldiers in Korean War. Or so we thought in Turkey.

That theory fell apart when Turks realized that their American allies were reluctant to support Turkey's protests of local Greek pressures and, at times, horrible brutalities against the Turkish Cypriots. US President Lyndon B. Johnson’s letter in 1964 was just the beginning of that frustration.

The Turkish-American relationship continued to have its ups and downs. The Turkish government enthusiastically supported Bush Sr. in the first Gulf war. But frustration followed: Turkey was unable to obtain any compensation for its ensuing economic losses.

Subsequently, the Turkish Parliament rejected supporting Bush Jr. in the Iraq war. While that probably didn't frustrate its people, it did frustrate the US government. The Turkish people were generally sympathetic to the US until the Iraq war. The US invasion of Iraq changed all that, as it has in many other countries.

It is fair to say that the Turkish-American economic relationship has generally been overshadowed by these greater political ebbs and flows. Note, for example, that Turkish exports to the largest economy in the world is only around $5 billion (less than 6 percent of Turkey's total exports and 0.5 percent total US imports) while its imports are around $6 billion (4.5 percent of Turkish imports and 0.7 percent of US exports). It is fair to say that Turkey does not benefit from any special commercial treatment from the US (unlike Israel), while it is frequently lobbied by larger US interests such as weapons or aircraft manufacturers.

However, it is also known that Turkey is criticized from time to time by Washington circles for exporting critical weapons systems. But Turkey never got back the uranium it had sent the US in the 1960s to be enriched under mutual agreement for use in its small, peaceful research reactors.

The powerful Armenian diaspora is now trying to bring the genocide claims to Congress. Renowned US historians such as Bernard Lewis and Justin McCarthy have a lot to say about the truth behind these claims, which are becoming a major international case of sheer abuse of historical tribulations by Armenians and Turks alike.

That abuse by the diaspora Armenians does not help Armenia, which currently is busy trying to feed its military invasion force in Azerbaijan by taking away valuable economic resources from its people and development.

But if taken seriously by the US Congress, that abuse, which has a proven ability to mislead many ordinary people, will not help Turkish-American economic relations, which are so far from where they could be. Today's Zaman