Armenia and Assad: the story of failed "love"

When you become acquainted with the history of Armenian-Syrian friendship, tears come to your eyes—it’s all so touching. In the early centuries, the history is completely muddled; it’s clear that it was written hastily. After the nomadic Armenians reached Aleppo in the last century, Armenian dreamers began writing about ancient ties and similar themes, constructing facts based on their own beliefs rather than historical accuracy. But then, everything seems to start clearing up.

After thousands of years of stagnation, it turned out that love, from the time of Justinian or someone else, still endures. Armenia (which had suddenly found itself in the Caucasus) and Syria were brought closer together by mutual hostility toward Turkiye. In 2014, Syria recognized the "Armenian Genocide." During the 44-day war, Bashar al-Assad, who had not yet fled, sided with Armenia and supported its "right to self-determination" wholeheartedly. Assad actively propagated the false story about the delivery of pro-Turkish rebels to Karabakh. However, this same figure did not recognize any "self-determination" in his own country, which made it even more gratifying for Armenians.

The blossoming of the relationship began in 2009. Before that, it seems Syrians habitually looked for Armenians somewhere in Mesopotamia, only to discover that they had already settled in the South Caucasus. In short, they found them. In June 2009, Bashar al-Assad visited the region. Serzh Sargsyan was pleased, even though the guest violated protocol by not honoring Tsitsernakaberd with his presence. After Yerevan, Assad was scheduled to visit Baku, which led to a staged performance. This awkwardness was lightened by the presentation of the highest award of the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Cross of St. George, by Garegin II himself. The award, it was reported, was given in recognition of Assad's support for the Armenians.

Both Assad Sr. and Jr. truly earned the gratitude of the Armenians. Under their rule, Armenians enjoyed complete freedom of action. Armenian terrorist organizations operated freely within Syria, with their headquarters and training bases located there. ASALA and the "Apostle" operated completely legally. While ASALA is widely known, the "Apostle" needs some clarification. This so-called Armenian Defense Association, founded in 2001 by citizens of Armenia, Syria, and Lebanon, aimed to carry out terrorist attacks on Turkish and Azerbaijani territory.

Thus, when Bashar al-Assad arrived in Armenia in June 2009, in addition to recognizing the right of Armenians to self-determination, he unsurprisingly discussed oil transit through Armenia and logistics. To implement these ambitious plans, normalizing relations with Turkiye and opening borders were required. The Syrian president, who had just reconciled with Ankara, promised Sargsyan to put in a good word. But nothing came of it because the "football diplomacy" between Yerevan and Ankara failed. Moreover, Azerbaijan played a significant role in this failure, as Damascus denied the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan both rhetorically and practically. During the UN General Assembly vote on March 14, 2008, on the resolution submitted by Azerbaijan regarding "the situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan," Syria (like Iran, by the way) chose to abstain.

Let’s not forget that Armenia's first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, also has roots in Syria. The local community nurtured many figures who later engaged in terrorist attacks, participated in the First Karabakh War, and shed innocent blood. The Armenian lobby in Syria has always been influential. The assistance it openly provided to Armenian occupiers in the early 90s could rightfully be called Syrian support.

In 2011, Armenian Foreign Minister Nalbandian visited Damascus. According to local media reports, at a meeting with his Syrian counterpart, Nalbandian stated that Yerevan was interested in delaying peace talks under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group, and Syria's neutral position was extremely helpful in this regard. In turn, Minister Muallim promised to influence Turkiye on the issue of opening borders with Armenia.

It seems that Damascus, much like Yerevan, was not great at keeping promises. It miscalculated, not anticipating that Baku’s influence on Ankara was far stronger than the opinion of a dozen Syrians.

When the civil war broke out in spring 2011, the Armenians of Syria feared that their strong support for Assad would put them at risk, so they began packing. By that time, the Armenian community had reached 100,000, with most Armenians living in Aleppo. As the war unfolded, the size of the community began to shrink. True to their historical tradition, Armenians started to roam. Many moved to Armenia, and a large number relocated to the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Some reports suggest that several thousand Syrian Armenians settled in these territories (though Armenia claims only 90). Only Assad knows where they are now.

The settlement of Syrian Armenians in these areas was part of Yerevan’s policy of illegally settling occupied lands. The local Karabakh Armenians themselves were gradually leaving the occupied territories in search of security and a livelihood. Refugees from Syria became "fresh blood" for the separatist regime. The illegal "government" felt entitled to invite Syrian Armenians to these areas and allowed them to settle in homes abandoned by Azerbaijanis during the First Karabakh War. Syrians were resettled in places like Lachin and Zangilan, which were under occupation at that time. The empty homes of displaced Azerbaijanis were repaired, and the settlers were promised "ownership rights." Syrians who moved to Eastern Zangezur were even promised the status of "repatriates," meaning they were considered to be returning to their "historical homeland."

With the pro-Turkish opposition’s offensive in November 2024, Syrian Armenians once again grabbed their bags. They were uncertain and afraid, not knowing what would happen if the favorites of the former government were toppled. Armenians had been Assad's favorites, and this was no secret. They had expected Aleppo would not fall to the rebels, but all their defenders fled. Russian units withdrew from the country, and the pro-Iranian forces also retreated.

The so-called humanitarian mission of Armenia left the country first. Mine clearance specialists and medical workers departed at the end of November as the situation worsened. Apparently, they considered that the Armenians of Aleppo no longer needed medical assistance and demining. Local Armenians woke up one morning to find their support and hope had disappeared. Then, news emerged about the departure of the Consul General of Armenia from Aleppo to Damascus. Although the Armenian Foreign Ministry vehemently denied it and tried to explain the Consul General's absence, the community was left deeply disappointed and fearful.

The forces that came to power reassured everyone, promising that there would be no discrimination based on ethnic or religious grounds. But the Armenians remained afraid, because they knew their "snouts were full of fluff." Experts predict that the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad would mark the end of the Armenian diaspora in Syria. In any case, they will likely never enjoy their former freedom. By "freedom," we don’t mean civil rights, but the freedom to turn Syria into a breeding ground for terrorism against Turkiye and Azerbaijan.

Where the Armenians will run next is something they will have to figure out in Yerevan. Perhaps writing letters to Assad in Moscow will help.