From Shusha to Moscow: Triangle in making

By Azernews

By Orkhan Amashov

At a time when Russia is becoming increasingly isolated on the international stage over the Ukrainian crisis, Azerbaijan has taken a decisive step to upgrade its ties with Moscow into a whole new level, by signing a comprehensive deal that, in its scope and reach, is probably a milestone of some sort, albeit falling short of being epochal. As of 22 February 2022, Baku and Moscow are formally allies on a number of critical international issues.

It is highly unlikely that the timing of the signing of the document was accidental. Although the work on the declaration has been underway for some considerable time, it was not obviously a development under gestation for large swathes of the public.

However, there were some unmistakable signs that a shrewd observer wouldn’t have missed. President Aliyev and his Russian counterpart have repeatedly praised the level of bilateral ties in the past, and there was a clear acknowledgement that Baku and Moscow had long moved from being strategic partners to a qualitatively superior form of co-operation. In some sense, the two countries had already been de facto allies in relation to myriad international issues, prior to the declaration.

However, the timing remains relevant. As the Kremlin is facing a new barrage of Western-approved sanctions, the formalisation of allied interaction with Azerbaijan may be perceived as a demonstrative act, underpinning Moscow’s claim that it is not isolated and friendless. For Baku, the declaration provided a fresh additional guarantee that, in the wake of the Kremlin’s recognition of the two eastern Ukrainian regions as independent states, its relations with Moscow are firmly grounded on the principles of mutual respect for independence, state sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of the state borders of the two countries, together with adherence to the principles of non-interference in each other's internal affairs, as enshrined in Article 1 of the document.

The Moscow Declaration serves to consolidate pre-existing arrangements between the two nations, agreed upon over the past 30 years. The document’s substantive core is inclusive of the principal points ingrained in the texts of the 1997 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Security, the 2008 Declaration of Friendship and Strategic Partnership and the 2018 Joint Statement between the Presidents of the two nations.

However, the Moscow declaration is not a mere review and summary of the bilateral agreements signed so far. Article 4 of the declaration presupposes a certain degree of alignment of foreign policy priorities for the two nations. For example, Russia and Azerbaijan hold similar or identical positions on topical international issues, and Article 7 states that the parties will refrain from any actions that, in the opinion of one of the Parties, damage the strategic partnership and allied relations of the two states.

Despite this, the cumulative impact of these two articles does not amount to the assertion that Azerbaijan and Russia are bound to share the same view on a full range of international issues. There are certain caveats included within the declaration which provide a balancing influence. First of all, Article 2 states that both nations will pursue an independent foreign policy aimed at protecting their national interests. Secondly, the parties will take coordinated steps that are commensurate with the norms of international law, and coordinated steps will be taken within the framework of, amongst other institutions, the UN and OSCE.

Thirdly, Article 3 states the parties are interacting in the field of foreign policy activities in order to ensure stability and security in the Caucasus and Caspian regions. This does not preclude a similar type of behaviour in other regions of the world, but it clearly defines the focal point of the interaction in relation to which the parties have taken upon themselves to act. Consequently, the Moscow declaration should not be interpreted as Baku’s newly-adopted obligation to pursue the Russian line in respect to the subjects, as to which its considered opinion is not in accordance with the worldview advocated by the Kremlin.

Fourthly, there is a certain degree of “constructive ambiguity”, conventionally applicable to this type of agreement, which mandates that any practical measure taken pursuant to the declaration will be subject to “legal flexibility” and realpolitik, enabling Baku to maintain its manoeuvrability.

The alliance agreement signed in Moscow does not cancel the Shusha declaration; quite the reverse, as it complements this within Baku's larger regional foreign policy design. It has long been at the heart of Azerbaijan’s master plan to deepen its relations with both heavyweights so that Moscow and Ankara are not at loggerheads in the South Caucasus. The carefully implemented steps of Baku paid off during the course of the Second Karabakh War and the expectation now is that, in the wake of the Moscow declaration, the design in question will reach a more refined appearance and evolve into a durable triangle.

The two documents in question, despite being similar in many ways, are not quite identical, as the Shusha declaration is more of a framework envisaging a deeper form of integration, whereas the Moscow document is about mutual obligations.

The Moscow declaration reaffirms the geopolitical construct established pursuant to the November 10 ceasefire deal and, in this sense, serves to strengthen Baku’s clout in the post-conflict normalisation process. Article 9 reaffirms the parties’ adherence to the trilateral format and statements adopted within it. The document also gives rise to a tentative assumption that Russia will improve its peacekeeping mission in Karabakh in line with the newly manifested allied relationship. There is also a school of thought that the declaration may possibly give a new impetus to prospective peace treaty talks between Baku and Yerevan, forcing the hands of the latter.

Article 11 of the declaration states that the parties will resolutely suppress the activities of organisations and persons directed against the state sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the other party on their respective territories. This point is interesting in light of the frequent trips made by the leader of the illegal and unrecognised entity based in Khankandi to Moscow, which have repeatedly caused righteous perturbation in Baku.

On the whole, it would be premature to issue a conclusive verdict on the merits of the Moscow declaration and the full range of implications that its provisions will engender. At this juncture, it does seem, to a greater extent, to fit in with the logic of the recent developments and thus does not appear to put a different complexion on the facts on the ground.