Akbar Novruz

After years of rhetoric, red lines, and stalled negotiations, movement in the South Caucasus is now coming from an unlikely source: process. Armenia’s decision to publish the implementation framework of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity - TRIPP (Zangazur Corridor), is less dramatic than it first appears, but more consequential than its legal modesty suggests. No signatures were added, no borders redrawn, and no legal commitments announced.

Officially, the document creates no binding obligations. Politically, however, it marks another incremental step in a process that has been quietly gaining momentum since the August 8 Washington meeting between Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.

The document was presented following a meeting held in Washington on the previous day between Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The ministry emphasized that the document does not create legally binding obligations for either Armenia or the United States and is intended to serve as a framework agreement.

Under the text, the TRIPP framework describes mechanisms for launching multimodal transit connectivity through Armenian territory. The project is presented as an infrastructure initiative aimed at ensuring unobstructed transit, linking mainland Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, and forming a key segment of the Trans-Caspian trade route.

The Foreign Ministry noted that implementation of the project will be based on the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and reciprocity. Its stated objectives include strengthening the security and economic development of Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as expanding regional trade and transit opportunities between Central Asia, the Caspian Sea region, and Europe.

The project envisages the creation of a dedicated company to oversee the development and operation of TRIPP.

A structure is planned under which the United States would hold a controlling stake, while Armenia would retain oversight mechanisms on key issues.

The proposed model grants construction and operating rights for 49 years, with the option to extend for an additional 50 years. At the initial stage, 74 percent of shares would be allocated to the United States and 26 percent to Armenia. In the event of an extension, Armenia’s stake could increase to up to 49 percent. Any changes in shareholding or final beneficial ownership would require prior approval from both the Armenian and U.S. governments.

Seen in this light, the disclosure is not a rupture but a continuation. It reflects the slow, workmanlike consolidation of a connectivity agenda that has moved beyond slogans and into institutional design. The fact that the framework was presented immediately after talks between Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio only reinforces that sense of sequencing rather than spontaneity.

The most striking feature of the document is not what it promises, but who stands behind it. TRIPP carries Donald Trump’s name, and the framework makes clear that Washington is not merely endorsing the idea but anchoring itself inside the mechanism. A U.S.-controlled operating company, long-term construction and management rights, and American involvement in digital customs systems and training programmes all point to a level of commitment that goes beyond diplomatic facilitation. This is the United States inserting itself as a guarantor of process, not just a sponsor of dialogue.

For Armenia, this arrangement is carefully framed to avoid the most sensitive red lines. The document repeatedly stresses sovereignty, territorial integrity, and full retention of legislative, judicial, security, and customs authority. The proposed “front-office/back-office” model, where private operators handle technical and customer-facing tasks while Armenian state bodies retain final decision-making power, is clearly designed to neutralise domestic accusations of lost control. In form, this is not an extraterritorial corridor; in function, it is a tightly managed transit regime.

For Azerbaijan, the framework represents something equally important: normalization through practice. By embedding transit connectivity in a commercial, multimodal, and internationally supervised structure, the TRIPP (Zangazur Corridor) shifts the corridor debate away from existential politics and toward operational reality. Railways, highways, digital systems, and revenue models replace zero-sum rhetoric. This is not yet the corridor itself, but it is a rehearsal for one.

The emphasis on gradualism is deliberate. The framework does not declare the corridor “launched”; it presents TRIPP as the next step in its realization. Pilot projects, risk-based inspections, digital documentation, and phased implementation suggest a process intended to advance through accumulation rather than breakthrough. In this sense, the document reads less like a grand geopolitical blueprint and more like the kind of technocratic scaffolding that precedes durable change.

Critics will note the asymmetry built into the structure: a U.S. controlling stake, decades-long operating rights, and significant influence over infrastructure that cuts across Armenian territory. Supporters counter that precisely this external anchoring makes the project viable, insulating it from domestic political swings and regional distrust. Both views are valid, but they miss the larger point. The framework is not attempting to resolve every political contradiction upfront; it is designed to keep the process moving despite them.

The project is poised to have substantial economic and geopolitical implications that extend far beyond Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Economically, the corridor forms a critical segment of the Middle Corridor, the overland trade route connecting East Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus. According to forecasts by the World Bank, annual freight volumes on the Middle Corridor could triple by 2030, reaching around 11 million tonnes, a dramatic increase from current levels. Annual freight capacity for the Zangazur Corridor itself is envisioned at about 15 million tonnes, underscoring its potential as a high-volume transit route.

Beyond freight numbers, the corridor could underpin significant economic gains. One modelling exercise suggests the emerging trade route could unlock as much as $50 billion to $100 billion in annual trade value by 2027, driven by reductions in transit times and logistics costs when compared to traditional routes. For Azerbaijan specifically, these projections include an increase of roughly $700 million in exports annually and potential growth of the non-oil economy by around 2 per cent per year once the route is operational.

Linked infrastructure developments also promise to stimulate regional economies. For Türkiye, transport analysts estimate that the corridor could deliver TL 147.6 billion (around $3.6 billion) over thirty years in economic value, chiefly by enhancing cargo throughput and unlocking growth in its eastern provinces.

From a geopolitical perspective, the corridor’s significance is multi-layered. It strengthens Eurasian connectivity, offering an alternative to the Northern Route through Russia and Belarus and diversifying global supply chains that have been strained by recent conflicts and sanctions regimes. By knitting together Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye, the route creates a continuous land bridge between Asia and Europe that could reduce transit times by more than ten days relative to existing pathways.

The corridor’s strategic appeal also stems from its potential to reshape regional power dynamics. For Ankara, it represents a tangible geoeconomic pivot toward positioning Türkiye as a logistics and energy hub in Eurasia; for Baku, it consolidates a transit role that strengthens ties within the Turkic world and beyond; and for Western capitals it offers a means of integrating the South Caucasus more deeply into Euro-Atlantic and global economic networks.

Moreover, increased connectivity may bolster European energy security, as expanded routes could facilitate greater flows of Caspian gas and other commodities to EU markets seeking alternatives to Russian supplies. Projections by energy analysts suggest that closing Armenia’s connectivity gap would allow Azerbaijan to play a more central role in meeting Europe’s growing demand for diversified energy imports.

Nevertheless, realising this potential depends not only on infrastructure but on political stability and sustained cooperation among regional actors. Skeptics point to the complex sovereignty concerns embedded in passage through Armenia’s Syunik province and the need for robust international guarantees to reassure all parties.

What the TRIPP document ultimately signals is not the sudden arrival of peace or connectivity, but the institutionalization of momentum. It ties the August Washington declaration to a concrete implementation pathway, places the United States visibly on the hook, and reframes regional connectivity as a managed, commercial, and incremental endeavour. Whether the corridor fully materializes will depend on execution, trust, and regional stability. But the logic of the process is now clearer: this is no longer about whether connectivity should happen, but about how it will be made to work.