Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, in a recent address to the National Assembly, claimed that Armenia and Azerbaijan have completed negotiations on a draft peace agreement and are now entering the phase of signing it. He expressed his readiness to sign the document “on behalf of the people of Armenia” and proposed that both countries simultaneously sign a joint petition to dissolve the OSCE Minsk Group—an initiative he framed as a necessary step to close the chapter on the Garabagh conflict.

While Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan recently declared that peace talks with Azerbaijan have reached the signing phase, a closer look reveals that Yerevan is once again resorting to manipulative tactics—particularly around the issue of the OSCE Minsk Group.

Despite the group's long-standing irrelevance following Azerbaijan’s full restoration of its territorial integrity, Armenia continues to play games around its formal dissolution. In his latest remarks, Pashinyan proposed a joint signing of the peace treaty and a petition to dissolve the Minsk Group. Undoubtedly, it is a big and a positive sign. On the surface, this may appear to reflect a desire for closure. In reality, it’s a diplomatic trap.

Mechanism of conflict dressed as diplomacy

The Minsk Group, in its current form, serves no constructive purpose. As long as it exists, it acts as a shadow over the process, preserving the illusion of an “unresolved conflict.” Armenia knows this. Its refusal to decisively endorse the group's dissolution only prolongs the status quo. Yerevan, despite lacking the strategic leverage to dictate terms, is trying to use this mechanism as a bargaining chip—failing to acknowledge that it is no longer in a position to do so.

Constitutional contradictions and selective interpretations

Another layer of this manipulation lies in Armenia’s constitutional stance. The preamble to its Declaration of Independence includes a direct reference to the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. This language is not symbolic; it has had real legal implications. For instance, in 1998, Armenia’s Constitutional Court deemed that Robert Kocharyan, despite residing in Garabagh, met the residency requirement to run for president—blurring the line between Armenia and Azerbaijani territory.

If Yerevan is serious about peace, a constitutional amendment is essential. Similar steps have been taken in global precedents. Ireland, for example, revised its constitutional claim to Northern Ireland via a referendum in 1998 to advance its peace process with the UK. Likewise, North Macedonia held a referendum on its name change—an unpopular but necessary move to resolve regional disputes.

Meanwhile, Armenia’s attempts to drag Azerbaijan’s Constitution into the discussion fall flat. There are no territorial claims against Armenia in any Azerbaijani state document—not in the Constitution, nor in the Declaration of Independence. Even references to the First Republic of 1918-1920 have been taken out of context. If that line of argument were valid, Georgia’s own Declaration—referencing its 1918-1920 republic when it controlled parts of modern Armenia—would provoke similar concerns, which it does not.

Pashinyan also insists that the dissolution of the Minsk Group requires OSCE consensus. However, Armenia, along with its traditional backers France and the United States (under the Biden administration), already opposed the group's termination at the 2024 OSCE Ministerial Council in Malta. If the matter were raised again, the same trio would likely block consensus. This reveals the real concern: preserving the Minsk Group as a diplomatic lever, not a peacebuilding tool.

The time for games is over. For any peace treaty to be durable, the Minsk Group must be formally dissolved. Half-measures or conditional proposals will only serve to stall the process further. Unless Armenia meets Azerbaijan’s key conditions—starting with constitutional clarity and dismantling outdated diplomatic structures—peace will remain a mirage.

There are no alternative paths forward. Azerbaijan has moved beyond the post-Soviet frameworks that allowed frozen conflicts to linger. It’s time for Armenia—and its allies—to do the same.